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ABSTRACT
In this work, we present a distributed cognitive architecture used to control the traffic in
an urban network. This architecture relies on a machine consciousness approach - Global
Workspace Theory - in order to use competition and broadcast, allowing a group of local
traffic controllers to interact, resulting in a better group performance. The main idea is
that the local controllers usually perform a purely reactive behavior, defining the times of
red and green lights, according just to local information. These local controllers compete
in order to define which of them is experiencing the most critical traffic situation. The
controller in the worst condition gains access to the global workspace, further broadcast-
ing its condition (and its location) to all other controllers, asking for their help in dealing
with its situation. This call from the controller accessing the global workspace will cause
an interference in the reactive local behavior, for those local controllers with some chance
in helping the controller in a critical condition, by containing traffic in its direction. This
group behavior, coordinated by the global workspace strategy, turns the once reactive be-
havior into a kind of deliberative one. We show that this strategy is capable of improving
the overall mean travel time of vehicles flowing through the urban network. A consistent
gain in performance with the “Machine Consciousness” traffic signal controller during
all simulation time, throughout different simulated scenarios, could be observed, ranging
from around 10% to more than 20%, when compared to the “Parallel Reactive” controller
without the artificial consciousness mechanism, producing evidence to support the hy-
pothesis that an artificial consciousness mechanism, which serially broadcasts content to
automatic processes, can bring advantages to the global task performed by a society of
parallel agents working together for a common goal.
Keywords: Global Workspace Theory, Traffic Lights Control, Machine Conscious-
ness, Codelets.
RESUMO
Neste trabalho, apresentamos uma arquitetura cognitiva distribuída usada para o controle
de tráfego em uma rede urbana. Essa arquitetura se baseia em uma abordagem de con-
sciência de máquina - Teoria do Workspace Global - de forma a usar competição e difusão
em broadcast, permitindo que um grupo de controladores de tráfego locais interajam, re-
sultando em melhor desempenho do grupo. A ideia principal é que controladores locais
geralmente realizam um comportamento reativo, definindo os tempos de verde e vermelho
do semáforo, de acordo com informações locais. Esses controladores locais competem de
forma a definir qual deles está experienciando a situação mais crítica. O controlador nas
piores condições ganha acesso ao workspace global, e depois realiza uma difusão em broad-
cast de sua condição (e sua localização) para todos os outros controladores, pedindo sua
ajuda para lidar com sua situação. Essa chamada do controlador que acessa o workspace
global causará uma interferência no comportamento local reativo, para aqueles contro-
ladores locais com alguma chance de ajudar o controlador na situação crítica, contendo
o tráfego na sua direção. Esse comportamento do grupo, coordenado pela estratégia do
workspace global, transforma o comportamento reativo anterior em uma forma de com-
portamento deliberativo. Nós mostramos que essa estratégia é capaz de melhorar a média
do tempo de viagem de todos os veículos que fluem na rede urbana. Um ganho consistente
no desempenho foi conseguido com o controlador “Consciência de Máquina” durante todo
o tempo da simulação, em diferentes cenários, indo de 10% até mais de 20%, quando
comparado ao controlador “Reativo Paralelo” sem o mecanismo de consciência artificial,
produzindo evidência para suportar a hipótese de que um mecanismo de consciência ar-
tificial, que difunde serialmente em broadcast conteúdo para processos automáticos, pode
trazer vantagens para uma tarefa global realizada por uma sociedade de agentes paralelos
que operam juntos por uma meta comum.
Palavras-chave: Teoria do Workspace Global, Controle de Tráfego, Consciência de
Máquina, Codelets.
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“. . . some anatomists have estimated
that the typical human neocortex
contains around thirty billion neu-
rons (30,000,000,000) . . . Those thirty
billions cells are you. They contain
almost all your memories, knowl-
edge, skills, and accumulated life
experience. . . I still find this fact as-
tounding. That a thin sheet of cells
sees, feels, and creates our world-
view is just short of incredible. . . the
dreams we have for a better world
are somehow the creation of these
cells. . . the mind is the creation of
the cells in the brain. There is noth-
ing else, no magic, no special sauce,
only neurons and a dance of informa-
tion. . .We need to understand what
these thirty billion cells do and how
they do it. . . how it gives rise to the
human mind.”
Jeff Hawkins, On Intelligence.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 What is the Motivation Behind Engineering
Applications in Urban Traffic Signal Control?
On November 2009, IEEE Spectrum Magazine published an article called Engineering
Achievements: The Two Lists (Lucky, 2009), showing on one side the 20 biggest engi-
neering achievements of the 20th century and on the other side the 14 biggest engineering
challenges to be achieved in the 21st century. Both lists were elaborated by the American
National Academy of Engineering (NAE)1. Figure 1.1 presents both lists.
The choice of the biggest achievements was based mainly on the benefits posed to
society. According to the author, Robert Lucky, even though the “old list” has profoundly
changed society, it began with simple inventions, in the classic style, made by a small group
of scientists, focused in solving small problems, that later represented big benefits in bigger
systems, as in a bottom-up approach. For instance, the transistor was invented to improve
telephone circuits and the Internet was invented to transfer files between Mainframes, in
a time when it was believed that the market for computers was composed solely by huge
corporations with specific demands.
Lucky says that the “new list” brings changes in this paradigm. The author observes
a top-down approach, with benefits to society pointed a priori and then being used to mo-
tivate engineers to invent systems that solve the demands posed. This approach requires
multidisciplinary teams oriented towards innovation.
However, what is the most significant in both lists, more than the paradigm change in
the approach, is the cause and effect relation between the two lists. The automobile was
not projected to populate huge cities neighborhoods, nor the air conditioning was invented
1http://www.engineeringchallenges.org/challenges.aspx
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Figure 1.1: Two lists: on one side the 20 biggest engineering achievements of the 20th
century and on the other side the 14 biggest engineering challenges to be achieved in the
21st century. Source: National Academy of Engineering; Credits: Steve Wisbauer/Getty
Images
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to make it possible to have huge cities in hot climate zones. Nevertheless, these inventions
collaborated to the rural exodus and the uncontrolled growth in cities populations. The
inventions of the 20th century changed society in a more profound way than their inventors
could have planned or expected. In the present century, as a matter of fact, we have a
challenge list dealing mostly with the consequences of the uncontrolled population growth,
mainly in big cities.
From the “new list”, the challenge mostly related to this work is “restore and improve
urban infrastructure”, although we can say that “reverse engineer the brain” also plays
an important role. In Brazil, a large rural exodus happened during the second half of
the 20th century, giving birth to huge cities like São Paulo, with more than 20 million
people in its metropolitan area. According to the architect de Medeiros (2006), Brazilian
cities are, from a transportation point of view, the least accessible ones in the world, with
urban mobility indexes lower than cities in the Middle East, which in most cases resemble
a maze. The current state of our infrastructure is inadequate to deal with the current
urban mobility demand: there is a gap in investments since the 1980’s, in opposition to
the already mentioned population growth and the vehicle fleet growth. Only in the state
of São Paulo, the number of vehicles grew from 9.85 millions in 1999 to 19.139 millions
in 2009.
Population in Brazilian cities grows faster than the transportation network capacity,
in such a way that the public administration can not keep up with transportation require-
ments in urban areas. As a consequence, inhabitants spend a considerable amount of
their daily work time commuting, locked in traffic jams, with unpredictable travel times,
leading to personal implications, such as physical and mental health deterioration, social
problems, caused by the reduction of public areas inside the city, economic problems,
caused by waste of working hours, fuel and accidents, and environmental problems, such
as atmospheric pollution and greenhouse effect.
This problem is not a Brazilian privilege. In Asia, for instance, where there is the
biggest concentration of cities with more than 10 million people in the world, rural exodus
is still in course and the same kind of issues arise, only in this case in much bigger versions.
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Figure 1.2: Traffic jam in São Paulo, the biggest Brazilian city.
One approach to reduce this problem is the use of adaptive traffic light controllers, able
to change its control policy based on local information. Even though they are not able
to completely solve traffic problems, they produce significant improvements without the
need to change current infrastructure or transportation models (Sánchez-Medina et al.,
2010).
1.2 Why Studying Consciousness in Animals?
In vertebrate mammals, consciousness is a dynamic, integrated, multimodal mental
process (Fabbro et al., 2015). The scientific hypothesis for neural correlates sufficient for
this process is that they were naturally selected during animal evolution because they
permitted animals to plan for future events and deal with unexpected situations they had
never experienced before, in a complex and ever changing environment (Crick & Koch,
2003; Baars & Franklin, 2009; Edelman et al., 2011; Baars et al., 2013). The main advan-
tages brought by such a mechanism are twofold. First, the serial stream of consciousness
provides an executive summary of perceptions. From all perceptual information at a given
moment being processed unconsciously (and in parallel), the most relevant information
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Figure 1.3: The scientific hypothesis is that consciousness brought competitive advantages
to animals which permitted them to deal with unexpected situations and somehow focus
attention in solving the most critical problem.
for the animal survival becomes conscious, generating a unique and integrated content,
conveying the necessary information for the animal to better deal with unexpected and
novel situations that differ from its common habits. Second, the attentional characteristic
of consciousness provides an adequate framework for behavioral learning, with the pro-
cesses of automation and deautomation of behaviors. During the automation process, as
novel situations become more and more frequent, conscious content is stored in long term
memory, becoming accessible for planning and making predictions. Once the process of
behavioral automation is concluded, action selection can happen without conscious inter-
ference. However, if an automated behaviour produces unexpected results, consciousness
regains control of action selection and information processing, which might result in the
deautomation of this previous behavior, and its consequent suppression. This mechanism
allows the creation and suppression of habits in animals, making their behavior extremely
adaptive to changing environments, what constitutes a great competitive advantage for
survival.
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1.3 Why Applying Machine Consciousness to
Urban Traffic Control?
Control and optimization of traffic lights phases is a key topic in improving cities
traffic conditions (Brockfeld et al., 2001; Srinivasan et al., 2006; Sánchez-Medina et al.,
2010). For large urban networks, though, there is a prohibitive number of variables, states,
stochastic aspects, uncertainty, interactions between subsystems, mutually exclusive goals,
and other issues (Guberinic et al., 2008), which make scenarios like these nearly impossible
to be solved with conventional strategies. In other words, traffic signal control systems are
large complex nonlinear stochastic systems. Therefore, it is hard to find optimal traffic
signal settings (Zhao et al., 2012).
However, traffic lights control in an urban network can be seen as a set of subsystems
operating in parallel, where each subsystem is a single junction composed of n traffic lights
influencing and being influenced by its neighbor subsystems. In most cases, each subsys-
tem is operated in isolation. However, for the network to function properly, it would be
interesting to have these subsystems interacting in a way that critical situations might be
avoided, such as in gridlocks and big traffic jams. This scenario is similar to what is found
in the animal body, where different isolated subsystems are coordinated by an executive
control nervous system, relying in both unconscious and conscious processes in order to
generate its overall behavior. In this central executive mechanism, consciousness can be
viewed as a supervisor process that takes care of many semi-autonomous subsystems.
The scientific hypothesis of this work is that an artificial mechanism, inspired on some
properties and models of consciousness, can bring advantages to automatic processes, such
as urban traffic lights control.
1.4 Main Contributions
The main original contribution of this work is the application of a machine conscious-
ness approach to urban traffic control, with the design and implementation of a solution
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proposal to the problem.
The application of a cognitive architecture with machine consciousness capabilities to
the control of a urban traffic network at the same time brings an enhancement to traffic
control technologies and advances to the understanding of the consciousness phenomenon
and to the possibility of its simulation (or emulation) in artificial creatures.
Moreover, during the time of this work, we were part of the team which designed
and implemented the foundations of the Cognitive Systems Toolkit, a toolkit to build
cognitive architectures, presented in further details in this publication, which will be used
in this work to build the cognitive architecture that will be controlling the traffic lights
with the machine consciousness capability.
1.5 How this Thesis is Organized
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we explain the
basics of the theory on urban traffic signal control and present its current state of the art.
In Chapter 3, we talk about the main theories of biological and machine consciousness,
including some background about Global Workspace Theory, the consciousness model we
will be relying on, in order to develop our machine consciousness approach. In Chapter 4,
we show the CST - the Cognitive System Toolkit - which is being developed by our research
group, and is used as the main basis for the construction of the cognitive architecture
which will be controlling our traffic lights. In Chapter 5, we present the materials and
methods for our experiments, describing the traffic simulation tool we used and some
details about how it models urban traffic networks. In this Chapter, we also explain the
cognitive architecture controlling the traffic lights by using Global Workspace Theory. In
Chapter 6, we present the main results we obtained with our simulations, and in Chapter
7 we provide a discussion for these results and the main conclusions.
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Chapter 2
Understanding Urban Traffic Signal
Control
In order to be able to test our hypothesis, which means designing and implementing a
machine consciousness mechanism applied to the control of urban traffic lights, the first
step is capturing the basics of the theory on urban traffic signal control and its current
state of the art. We do so in the following way: first, in section 2.1, we introduce the
theory of urban traffic signal control. In subsection 2.1.1, we present the mathematical
model of controlling traffic lights in an isolated junction. In subsection 2.1.2, we present
a model of how isolated junctions can be connected by a network of roads in order to
constitute a more complex scenario. In subsection 2.1.3, we talk about the main traffic
simulation techniques, which can be used in our experiments to transform the output
vehicles flow from a junction in input flows in the next junctions, over time, considering
the mathematical models presented before. Finally, in section 2.2, we present the state of
the art on traffic signal control, so we can do our best to stand on the successful previous
works on the matter. Indeed, one of these works will be chosen to be used as the main
heuristic of our controller.
2.1 Theory of Urban Traffic Signal Control
Traffic in an urban network can be modeled as a network of roads crossing in par-
ticular regions which are called “junctions”, together with a number of vehicles (and
possibly pedestrians) flowing into it. Junctions are mutually exclusive regions, because
they support a limited number of vehicles in a given time, what requires a discipline to
accommodate the many possible flows competing to use the junction region. Usually,
competing flows must be interrupted for some time, allowing other flows to have access to
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the junction, being this interruption resumed later such that all flows are able to share a
common resource. Each junction can be signalized (that is, controlled by traffic lights) or
not. Non-signalized junctions usually follow some prescribed set of rules, which discipline
which vehicle will get preference at a given time, in order to use the junction space. In a
particular case, a whole network might operate only with non-signalized junctions. This
might be an efficient way of controlling the traffic flows when the traffic is not intense.
Nevertheless, as soon as traffic increases in the network, some sections of a road might
have their traffic time reduced, in such a way that it becomes very inefficient, and the
probability of accidents in competing flows builds up. In these cases, usually the solution
is to start installing traffic lights in some specific junctions, such that a better discipline
might be in operation. In a typical scenario in large cities, there is a significant number
of junctions which are signalized, but there are also many junctions which are not. Those
junctions requiring the installation of lights are dependent on the traffic patterns typically
present on the urban network and evolve together with the network as traffic patterns
evolve in time.
A junction can be either isolated, with negligible influence on others, or can be suf-
ficiently close to others in order to influence their performance. Hence, junction control
must be formulated separately for different cases, such as an isolated junction, a sequence
of signalized junctions on a road or a network of roads with a significant number of
signalized junctions influencing one another.
In this work, the latter case is the main objective of treatment. However, in each one of
these cases, it is important to maintain the feasibility of the chosen phases to control each
junction. Consequently, we will start by formulating the control of an isolated junction.
2.1.1 Mathematical Model of Control in one Isolated
Signalized Junction
For each junction, we define a tuple (U ,Σ,W ,Y ,O1,O2), where:
• U is the set of light control functions u(t) = {u1(t), u2(t), ..., up(t), ..., uP (t)}, where
P is the number of independent lights in the junction and up(t) is a function which
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can assume values 0 or 1, being 0 considered as effective red and 1 as effective green1
controlling a specific light p. Usually, up(t) = up(t + kc), where k = 0,±1,±2, ...
and c is a constant called cycle time, which means up(t) is a periodic function. This
condition might be violated if an adaptive control law is applied.
• Σ is the set of input arrival flows of vehicles (or pedestrians) described by functions
σ(t) = {σ1(t), σ2(t), ..., σi(t), ..., σI(t)}, where I is the number of input flows. These
arrival flows are usually modeled using Poisson distributions.
• W is the set of queue states w(t) = {w1(t), w2(t), ..., wi(t), ..., wI(t)}, whose compo-
nents represent the size of the vehicles queues formed as a consequence of the arrival
flows.
• Y is the set of output flows in the junction y(t) = {y1(t), y2(t), ..., yh(t), ..., yH(t)},
where H is the number of output flows in the junction.
• O1 - state transformation function - Wt → Wt+1
• O2 - output function - Wt → Yt
Basic Relations in Vehicle Flow Sets
Consider Figure 2.1 as an example of the many flows possibly crossing a junction.
Figure 2.1: Junction illustrating vehicle flow relations (Guberinic et al., 2008)
1Yellow sign is incorporated in the effective red and green
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The flows must be compared to each other in order to obtain the constraints on
conflicting flows. The main relations, depicted in Figure 2.1 are:
• Conflict - trajectories cross or merge (σ1 and σ3).
• Non-conflict - trajectories do not cross or merge (σ1 and σ2).
• Compatibility - conflicting flows can go simultaneously, being resolved by the drivers
themselves. This solution can be used in a very intense traffic situation, despite the
risk of incidents, which is a disadvantage (σ3 and σ7).
Junctions or Signal Groups
If two flows n and m are in conflict, necessarily this means that while one of them has
un(t) = 1 (green light), the other one must have um(t) = 0 (red light). This means that
the number of necessary independent lights P in a junction is calculated based on how
the input flows i are connected to the output flows h. For each possible conflict, there
must be a pair of lights with opposite controls. Depending on the situation, flows in a
relation of compatibility might also require a pair of lights to discipline them.
When one or more input-output flows are controlled by the same traffic light up(t),
they form a junction (or signal) group.
Control Variables
A typical example for a particular junction group p is shown in Figure 2.2. In this
example, the following terms apply:
• up(t) - 0 for effective red and 1 for effective green;
• c - cycle time;
• t′p - time in which an effective green light starts for an specific junction group p, in
relation to the beginning of the cycle;
• t′′p - time in which the effective green light ends for an specific junction group p, in
relation to the beginning of the cycle;
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Figure 2.2: Control variables (Guberinic et al., 2008)
Signal Plan
Vector u(t) is called a Signal Plan, representing the traffic control in a signalized
junction in a cycle with duration c.
Control Vectors - Phases
An alternative representation for u(t) considers that, in any signal plan, there are
intervals in which all up(t) remain the same, assuming either a value of 0 or 1 during all
the interval. So, we can name such interval a phase and use the duration τ of each phase
in order to represent the full signal plan u(t). Hence, the plan can be represented as a
control vector containing each phase f and its duration τ :
u(t) = [(f1, τ1), (f2, τ2), ..., (fk, τk), ..., (fK , τK)], (2.1)
in which fk = (s1, s2, ..., sp, ..., sP ), sp ∈ {0, 1} and K is the number of phases in a
cycle, as shown in Figure 2.3, where e.g. f1 = (0, 1, 0, 1), P = 4 and K = 9.
Even though a completely adaptive set of phases shall be envisioned, usually a signal
plan maintains a fixed set of phases. One of the reasons for that is to avoid drivers in
presuming that there is a malfunctioning in the controller. In a completely fixed controller,
the set of phase durations {τk} is also fixed. An adaptive controller might change the
durations τk of each phase. This might happen maintaining a fixed overall cycle period
time
c =
K∑
k=1
τk
or even changing the duration of a cycle. The set of phases is usually called a “signal plan
structure”. A signal plan structure must be feasible as will be defined later.
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Figure 2.3: Signal control phases (Guberinic et al., 2008)
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Output Function - Vehicle Output Flow
Arrival flows σi are transformed by the signals, and the output flows yh are formed
by linear combinations of one or more arrival flows transformed. Output flows are of
no importance to control isolated junctions, but in the case of groups of junctions in a
network, its transformation when traveling between junctions is the most relevant function
in the solution model.
The Feasible Control Set
The set of feasible signal control plans is defined by the following constraints (Guberinic
et al., 2008):
1. Minimum of one green interval in a cycle for each junction;
2. Minimum green time;
3. Maximum red time;
4. Capacity restriction;
5. Simultaneous green lights for compatible groups only;
6. Minimum time between green lights;
7. Phases sequence restriction;
8. Sum of phases duration should be equal to the cycle total time;
9. Maximum cycle time.
Constraints 1, 3 and 9 can be relaxed in extreme situations, but not the others, because
of safety reasons.
General Formulation of the Isolated Junction Control Problem
A general formulation for the isolated junction control problem can be stated like that:
“Determine the phases duration τk in the control u(t) (signal plan), according to a
feasible set of phases fk, such that some sort of optimization criteria is employed.”
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2.1.2 Mathematical Model of an Urban Network of Roads
with Signalized Junctions
The control of signalized junctions in an urban network can be considered as a gen-
eralization of the isolated junction control. Instead of using an optimization criteria for
just a single junction, some sort of optimization criteria for the whole network shall be
employed. In order to do so, it is necessary to consider the network topology, and the
interactions between the output vehicles flow from a junction and the input flows of its
neighbor junctions, what implies in modeling the network of roads as part of the system.
An urban network of roads located in a given geographic region R can be modeled as
a graph GR(t) = (O,E,We,M), where O is a set of vertices representing the junctions, E
is a set of arcs related to the roads, We is a tuple of weight sets related to the arcs E and
M is a set of graphs corresponding to the detailed information of each vertex, elements
of the set O (see Figure 2.5b for an example of such graphs).
We define that:
• For each junction, there will be a corresponding vertex o ∈ O that represents a
junction, which can be one among three types:
– X, Y, L and T2 (Zanin, 2004) junction types;
– traffic signals;
– roads narrowing or enlarging.
• Each arc e ∈ E is so that e = (r, z), where r, z ∈ O;
• For each pair of junctions r, z ∈ O, there will be a road segment e = (r, z) ∈ E, if
and only if there is a direct path between junctions r and z, where r is the origin
and z is the destination, without intermediary junctions.
• We will be a tuple of weight sets (D, V,<,Φ, L, S, J, F ), all referring to the set E,
with cardinality |E|. Each element of each set of the tuple We is related to an
2X, Y, L and T here do not refer to the variables of the mathematical model, but instead to actual
junction types, as these letters are used to represent junction types iconically similar to the letters’
formats, as in Zanin (2004).
2.1. Theory of Urban Traffic Signal Control 36
element of the set E. Each set is defined as follows:
– D is the set of distances d, in which d refers to the euclidean distance between
intersections r and z related to a road segment e ∈ E.
– V is the set of average velocities v of the vehicles traveling in a road segment
e ∈ E in a given time t.
– < is the set of vehicle densities ρ related to the road segments e ∈ E in a given
time t.
– Φ is the set of vehicle flows φ related to the arcs e ∈ E in a given time t.
– L is the set of number of lanes l existing in the road segments e ∈ E in a given
time t.
– S is the set of maximum velocities s defined for the road segments e ∈ E in a
given time t.
– J is the set of maximum densities w defined for the segments e ∈ E in a given
time t.
– F is the set of maximum flows f defined for the segments e ∈ E in a given
time t.
• For each vertex o ∈ O, there is a related graph Nz ∈M , being Nz = (A,B,C), that
defines the junction characteristics, with A being the set of vertices that represent
the end of each lane, B being the set of arcs which represent all possible transitions
between each lane and C the tuple (D′, V ′,<′,Φ′, S ′, J ′, F ′) of weight sets of the
arcs B. Hence, we have:
– For each lane, the point immediately before the junction is represented by the
vertex a ∈ A.
– Whenever it is possible to transition from lane ai to lane aj, considering i 6= j,
there will be an arc b = (ai, aj) whose direction is from ai to aj, considering
b ∈ B.
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Figure 2.4: Urban roads representation. Panel 2.4a shows the map and Panel 2.4b shows
the corresponding graph.
– The sets D′, V ′,<′,Φ′, S ′, J ′ and F ′ of the tuple C with cardinality |B|, each
one of their elements corresponds to an element of B and their semantics
is equivalent to the one of the sets D, V,<,Φ, S, J and F of the tuple We,
respectively.
For instance, take the graph GR, with the set of vertices O and the set of arcs E,
shown in Figures 2.4a and 2.4b. The case of the graph NZ , whose vertices set is A and
the arcs set is B, is shown in Figures 2.5a and 2.5b.
2.1.3 Traffic Simulation Techniques
In order to consider the interactions between different junctions in the network topol-
ogy, we need to be able to transform the output vehicles flow from a junction into an
input flow in the next junction, over time. This can be achieved using traffic simulation
techniques.
From a traffic flow perspective, it is possible to classify traffic simulation techniques in
three different distinct types: microscopic, mesoscopic and macroscopic. The differences
between these models are related to the abstraction levels in which vehicle movement is
modeled and if the set of vehicles is treated as an aggregated mass or not.
• microscopic approach: vehicle movement is traced explicitly and they are repre-
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Figure 2.5: Detailed junction. Panel 2.5a, adapted from Maroto et al. (2006), shows
possible conversions, while Panel 2.5b shows the corresponding graph.
sented individually. Each vehicle is considered as an agent and there is an equation
describing each one of them.
• macroscopic approach: vehicle movement is traced implicitly and they are treated
as an aggregated mass. Similar to fluid dynamics (Richards, 1959), it is necessary
to determine the following variables: flux q(x, t), the number of vehicles flowing
in distance x during time t; space mean speed v(x, t), corresponding to the instant
average velocity in a distance x and time t and density k(x, t), corresponding to the
number of vehicles is a space unit.
• mesoscopic approach: vehicle movement is traced explicitly and they are represented
as an aggregated mass. A probability function f(t,x,v) is defined, which expresses
the probability of one vehicle existing in time t, in position x and velocity v. One
way of obtaining this function is resolving Boltzmann equations (Kutz, 2004).
Macroscopic and microscopic approaches are the most common ones used, with clear
advantages and disadvantages, depending on the application.
The macroscopic approach has the following advantages:
• Less inputs necessary to model a large scale networks, such as a whole city;
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• Less requirements related to map details;
• Less computational time to calculate outputs;
• Model calibration is easier.
The LWR macroscopic model described by Lighthill & Whitham (1955); Richards
(1959) was one of the first models to make it possible to simulate traffic in environments
with few map details (Kutz, 2004).
However, macroscopic approaches are incapable of modeling events such as conflicts
between cars, traffic light effects, among others, which are sometimes necessary. Micro-
scopic approaches are capable of modeling these microscopic events, requiring on the other
hand more computational power, that might become prohibitive, depending on the size
of the network, when all inputs are given.
In the domain of microscopic approaches, the use of cellular automata (Nagel &
Schreckenberg, 1992) makes it possible to reconstruct traffic situations by modeling the
interaction between running vehicles. Volume data and route distributions are sufficient to
guarantee satisfactory results, even when there is just small real time traffic data (Wahle
et al., 2002).
For instance, consider the following cellular automata, adapted from Knospe et al.
(2002), which represents a microscopic description of the vehicles movement using a set
of rules for each step.
The microscopic model structures, represented in Figure 2.6, are the following:
• Node: represents an intersection between roads;
• Arc: a road connecting to nodes.
• Lane: road segment where vehicles flow.
• Cell: discrete parts of one lane that are occupied by vehicles.
The urban network graph described in section 2.1.2 is transformed into an automata
structure mapping vertices into nodes, edges into arcs and spliting the arcs into cells.
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Figure 2.6: Microscopic model structures
Vehicles move advancing through the cells, changing lanes and arcs. In this model, cells
have an extension of 7.5 m, which is the space occupied by an average commercial vehicle.
Therefore, each cell can be occupied or free at any time. One cell may contain obstacles,
such as traffic lights, which might block vehicle flows. A bigger vehicle, like a truck, might
occupy more than one cell. Road maintenance can be represented by special vehicles
occupying many cells with velocity equals to zero.
A sophisticated behavior can be achieved with one simple strategy combining three
simple rules, as represented in Figure 2.7 (Knospe et al., 2002):
1. Vehicles accelerate until maximum velocity, in the long run. Stopped vehicles have a
smaller acceleration. The velocity of the first car in the arc is anticipated, permitting
smaller gaps and greater velocities.
2. Vehicles anticipate the need to break by watching next vehicle’s brake lights;
3. Vehicles always adjust velocity in order to maintain a security distance.
Vehicle movement is realized through the following variables, parameters and rules,
which are applied in parallel for each vehicle:
• Variables:
– x - position
– v - velocity
– vanti - anticipated velocity
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Figure 2.7: Road segment in the microscopic model. Arcs are divided in 7.5 m wide cells.
Each car has a discrete velocity between 0, . . . , V max. Vehicles represent ideal drivers,
who follow security rules, never accelerating more than the gap to the next vehicle.
– d - gap distance
– deff - effective gap distance
– b - brake light status
– p - deceleration probability
• Parameters:
– gapsafety - effectiveness of anticipation control
– vmax - maximum velocity
– pb - deceleration probability
– p0 - deceleration probability
– pd - deceleration probability
– th - gap time
– ts - security gap time
1. Acceleration rule
• bn (t + 1) = 0
• if ((bn + 1 (t) = 0) and (bn (t) = 0)) or (th >= ts ) then: vn (t + 1) = min(vn
(t) + 1, vmax ).
2. Deceleration rule (to avoid accidents)
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• vn (t + 1) = min(deffn , vn (t+1))
• if (vn (t + 1) < vn (t)) then: bn (t + 1) = 1.
3. Stochastic deceleration rule
• if (rand() < p) then:
• vn (t + 1) = max(vn (t + 1) - 1, 0)
• if (p = pb ) then: bn (t + 1) = 1.
4. Movement rule
• xn (t + 1) = xn (t) + vn (t + 1).
Where:
• deffpred = dpred + max(vanti - gapsafety , 0)
• th = dn /vn (t)
• ts = min(vn (t), h)
• p = p(vn (t), bn+1 (t), th , ts ) =
– pb, if bn + 1 = 1 and th < ts
– po, if vn = 0 and not (bn + 1 = 1 and th < ts )
– pd, elsewhere
According to Knospe et al. (2002), these parameters give a realistic result:
• vmax = 2
• pd = 0.1
• pb = 0.94
• po = 0.5
• h = 6
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Figure 2.8: Arc scheme and quantities related to lane changing rules. Colored cells are
occupied by vehicles.
• gapsafety = 1
Besides the movement rules presented above, the cellular automata also considers lane
changing rules. Actually, the system update is done in two steps, being the first step the
application of lane changing rules and the second the movement rules, applied in parallel
for each vehicle.
Figure 2.8 depicts quantities involved in lane changing rules. In order to change lanes,
the following rules are considered :
• Initiative rule
– (bn = 0) and (v(t) > d)
• Security rule
– (deffpred >= v(t)) and (dsucc >= vsucc )
In this cellular automata, one step may correspond to 1 second, 0.1 second, and so on.
Using a maximum velocity of two cells in each step, we reach 54 km/h, which is close to
the limit of 60 km/h that is found in many urban roads in Brazil.
2.2 State of the Art on Traffic Signal Control
The first applications of traffic signal control began using fixed-time control methods,
with a predetermined cycle and split time plan (green duration as a portion of the cycle
time), which were convenient for relatively stable and regular traffic flows. These signal
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control systems assume a periodic operation, in which each light goes through its sequence
of phases with calculated split parameters in a cycle that is offset from its neighbors. A
fixed-time plan can be built using offline optimization tools, such as TRANSYT (Robert-
son, 1969), SYNCHRO (Husch et al., 2003) and VISGAOST (Stevanovic, 2007), based
on historical traffic flow data, for specific time periods.
Later on, real-time traffic-responsive control came into practice with the help of sens-
ing technologies. The idea is that any traffic control action is made under a certain con-
trol strategy according to real-time traffic data. The cycle length might be dynamically
adjusted to meet the traffic demand. The SCAT system (Sims & Dobinson, 1980) dynam-
ically adjusts common cycle length of a given traffic network (or sub-network) to meet the
traffic demand. The SCOOT method (Robertson & Bretherton, 1991) and the ACS-Lite
(Luyanda et al., 2003) are examples which rely on the fixed-time offline calculation as a
baseline or contingency plan. In some traffic control systems, each intersection decides
which phase to apply in order to enforce safety and other constraints, rather than being
oriented towards a parametric timing plans (Mirchandani & Head, 2001; Papageorgiou
et al., 2003).
Finally, one major latter attempt was the introduction of computational intelligence,
trying to simulate the intelligence of nature to some extent by the usage of certain compu-
tational methods, which include artificial neural networks, fuzzy systems, and evolutionary
computation algorithms (Zhao et al., 2012).
Some approaches consider the problem only locally, restricted only to a small number
of traffic lights (Sik et al., 1999). Some reactive methods can achieve good performance
for isolated intersections, making decisions quickly based on traffic flow, like interval
between vehicles or anticipated queues of vehicles, but these methods are susceptible to
suboptimal decisions (Viti & van Zuylen, 2010; Lämmer & Helbing, 2008). However,
when dealing with the whole urban network, because of the non linear and stochastic
events which happen in the network and their inter-dependencies, the actual state of
traffic becomes hard to assess and the effects of changes in traffic control becomes almost
impossible to forecast (Srinivasan et al., 2006). Hence, how to achieve scalable network-
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wide optimization remains a challenging problem. Some methods try to produce more
optimal solutions considering a time horizon, which is divided into discrete intervals based
on a fixed time resolution, forming a state space which is searched via an optimization
process. Some examples include PRODYN (Henry et al., 1983), COP (Sen & Head, 1997),
ALLONS-D (Porche & Lafortune, 1999), OPAC (Gartner et al., 2002), ADPAS (Kim
et al., 2005) and CRONOS (Boillot et al., 2006). Network-wide control systems, such
as RHODES (Mirchandani & Head, 2001) and RT-TRACS (Gartner et al., 2002), either
apply additional signal control guidance from neighboring intersections that incorporates
non-local impact or extend the prediction horizon with flow information from neighboring
intersections. The SchIC method (Xie et al., 2012) can achieve search space reduction
and state elimination by exploiting structural flow information in the prediction horizon
and the intersection control problem is formulated as a scheduling problem, based on an
aggregate representation on flow data. Recent works investigated different approaches
to this problem, such as dynamic programming (Heung et al., 2005; Heydecker et al.,
2007), neuro-fuzzy networks (Choy et al., 2003) and reinforcement learning (Cai et al.,
2009). Nakamiti (1996) developed a distributed control traffic system using a distributed
computational intelligence approach. In this approach, agents have to interact with one
another seeking for cooperation, despite their incomplete, uncertain or even inconsistent
knowledge, using a symbiosis among distributed artificial intelligence, fuzzy sets theory,
case-based systems and genetic algorithms. Nakamiti’s distributed traffic control system
was applied to a central region of the city of Campinas, Brazil, concerning six junctions
with eighteen traffic lights. In simulations using real data, the distributed traffic controller
performed better than traditional fixed-time techniques, showing delay times 43% lower
and cars queues 24% smaller than the traditional fixed-time techniques optimized for
critical traffic scenarios.
Zhao et al. (2012) surveyed some commonly used computational intelligence (CI)
paradigms, analyzed their applications in traffic signal control (TSC) systems for ur-
ban surface-way and freeway networks, and introduced current and potential issues of
control and management of recurrent and non recurrent congestion in traffic networks.
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They showed fuzzy controllers applied to single junctions that can bring up to 13% of
improvement, and also fuzzy controllers for multiple junctions and lanes that brought
25% performance improvement. Applications of artificial neural networks were shown to
produce optimal instantaneous signal timing, while automatically adapting to long term
changes. Even in rush-hour conditions, improvements were still from 14.79% to 18.11%
in average delay time and from 11.79% to 14.21% in average travel time, compared with
the isolated fixed-time control method. Genetic algorithms and Swarm Intelligence ap-
proaches showed better real-time overall performances, effectively alleviating urban traffic
pressures and reducing waiting time of vehicles. The authors conclude that CI method-
ologies and technologies are effective solutions for TSC problems. According to them,
there is no criterion to determine which technology is more suitable or how to apply
these methodologies in the field of TSC. They also believe that some specific problems,
such as “blue corridors” for emergency vehicles, will find new ways to be solved. The
researchers state that more research work is needed to build the basis for the area and
finally poses that CI technology will play an active role in future intelligent traffic systems
development.
Box & Waterson (2013) developed one traffic light controller which learns strategies
based on previous experience. They used human experts to control a single microscopic
traffic simulation of an area in Southampton’s urban road network. The researchers used
the human experts’ decisions to train a neural network, which was later used to control the
simulation and achieved better results than earlier applied algorithms and benchmarks.
In Chapter 5, you will notice that we stood on their work to choose the main heuristic
used in the parallel reactive part of our controller.
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Chapter 3
An Emerging Science of Consciousness
After having captured the basics of the theory on urban traffic signal control and its
current state of the art in Chapter 2, it is time to apply the same method to the theories
of consciousness, as we intend to take advantage of the growing scientific knowledge about
consciousness processes in human mind, in order to be able to apply some of these concepts
in the design of our machine consciousness controller.
Consciousness is the fundamental problem of the human mind. Even though some
of the ideas of the philosopher René Descartes about the mind-body duality are rejected
by the mainstream community nowadays, one of his statements seems to be unanimous
among cognitive scientists, as it has captured so well and briefly the matter: “Cogito,
ergo sum”1. As all the experience of life in the physical world is accomplished through a
serial mainstream of thoughts known as “Consciousness”, the only way of being sure of
one’s existence is realizing one is able to think, that is, to somehow produce this train
of thoughts. The most difficult aspect of consciousness is the hard problem called qualia
(Chalmers, 1996). Qualia refers to the redness of red, the painfulness of pain, and so on.
How is it possible that physical processes going on inside the brain could give rise to the
sujective richness of consciousness? No one has produced any plausible explanation as to
how the subjective experience of the redness of red could arise from the objective actions
of the brain, not yet. However, we know that consciousness is part of the natural world,
and therefore must depend only on the imperfectly known laws of physics, chemistry, and
biology, which means it does not arise from some magical or otherworldly quality.
Despite the importance of this subject, the study of consciousness remained censored
in the scientific community during a long time. The main reason for this was a debate on
how to approach a subjective phenomenon in an objective way, that is, considering the
1“I think, therefore I am”.
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scientific method. It was not until the second half of the 20th century that more works
on the subject started to flourish, and more recently with the participation of famous
scientists, such as Crick & Koch (2003), the field started to take off and became more
respected to the point that it is today recognized that, in order to build a general-purpose,
real-life computational equivalent of a human mind (Samsonovich, 2012c), the problem of
consciousness still have to be solved.
As engineers, we do not want to focus in the philosophical issues of consciousness,
but in the practical ones. As with most of the biological phenomena, Engineering has a
lot to benefit from the growing knowledge about consciousness processes in human mind.
Engineers have perceived since long ago that they can take advantage of the solutions
nature has developed for many hard problems, through the iterations of natural selection
along millions of years of life evolution on planet Earth, and use the power of analogy
to build new infrastructure and frameworks that are powerful and can tackle real world
problems (Castro, 2006). In the case of consciousness, as argued in Chapter 1, it brings
great competitive advantage for animal survival by giving them power to deal with novel
unexpected situations, arming them with skills such as integrating information from all
senses in a single scene or perception, and also the power to automatize learned behaviours.
These skills can be used to solve many real world problems in engineering, and would be
of great value in an artificial agent.
The rest of this Chapter is organized as follows: in sections 3.1 and 3.2, we present
some of the theories of consciousness developed recently. Our objective in presenting these
theories is not to cover all approaches that can be found in literature, neither produce a
tutorial comparing these different approaches. Some authors, such as Cavanna & Nani
(2014), have dedicated a whole book for this matter. Our intention is to illustrate some
of the different theories, so the reader can take a short trip, before getting to the concepts
of the main theory we are going to stand on, and have a glimpse of what human mind
has recently produced trying to explain the consciousness phenomenon. We will be using
the same structure as Cavanna & Nani (2014) in order to present the many approaches:
split into philosophical theories (section 3.1), whose purpose is to examine and sift out
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different conceptual possibilities, in order to provide a theoretical framework for a valid
account of mental phenomena, and scientific theories (section 3.2), whose purpose is
to use experimental applications of scientific techniques (e.g., PET and fMRI scans of
living brains) to provide useful insights into the brain mechanisms, which bring about our
mental functions, the so-called neural correlates of consciousness. As this work’s focus is
the Global Workspace Theory, we will present in section 3.3 a detailed explanation of the
Global Workspace Algorithm. After that, in section 3.4 we present some of the state of
the art of applications of the Global Workspace Theory. We close this Chapter by stating
our definition of machine consciousness in section 3.5, to be used hereafter.
3.1 Philosophical Theories of Consciousness
3.1.1 René Descartes and the Mind-Body Dualism
René Descartes (1596-1650), the only author cited in this Chapter who was not alive by
the time this work was produced, is commonly considered the father of modern philosophy.
Descartes’ view of the natural world in pure mechanical terms heavily influenced the course
of the Western thought (Cavanna & Nani, 2014).
Descartes proposed the mind-body problem as we know it. His position, known as
Cartesian or classical dualism, holds that the human beings are composed of two sub-
stances, one which is purely material or corporeal, the res extensa, and another which is
purely immaterial or intellectual, the res cogitans. According to Descartes, human beings
are the only creatures in the world to be born with a soul. Animals, on the contrary,
are made by one ingredient, that is, matter, and thereby can be exclusively described in
mechanical terms.
Descartes was never able to fully explain how the material and the intellectual sub-
stances were supposed to interact. His hypothesis was that these two substances would
encounter in one brain organ called pineal gland, shown in Figure 3.1, which Descartes
believed to be the only brain organ that was not paired. Descartes’ hypothesis of the
pineal gland as the point of privileged contact between mind and body failed to give a
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Figure 3.1: Figure from Descartes’ De homine (1662), showing the location of the pineal
gland, identified by the letter H.
satisfactory solution of the mind-body problem. We now know, in fact, that the pineal
gland is involved in the regulation of the circadian rhythm by secreting melatonin and
has, like the other structures of the brain, a left and a right side that are mirror images
of each other (Cavanna & Nani, 2014).
3.1.2 John Searle and the Biological Argument
Searle (1980) introduced a famous thought experiment known as the “Chinese Room”,
to challenge the claim that it is possible for a computer running a program to have a
“mind” and “consciousness” in the same sense that people do.
Searle’s thought experiment begins with this hypothetical premise: suppose that ar-
tificial intelligence research has succeeded in constructing a computer that behaves as if
it understands Chinese. It takes Chinese characters as input and, by following the in-
structions of a computer program, produces other Chinese characters, which it presents as
output. Suppose that this computer performs its task so convincingly that it comfortably
passes the Turing test: it convinces a human Chinese speaker that the program is itself a
live Chinese speaker. To all of the questions that the person asks, it makes appropriate
responses, such that any Chinese speaker would be convinced that he is talking to another
Chinese-speaking human being.
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Figure 3.2: Illustration of the thought experiment proposed by Searle called Chinese
Room Experiment.
The question Searle wants to answer is this: does the machine literally “understand”
Chinese? Or is it merely simulating the ability to understand Chinese? Searle calls the
former position “Strong AI” and the latter “Weak AI”.
Searle then supposes that he is in a closed room and has a book with an English
version of the computer program, along with sufficient paper, pencils, erasers, and filing
cabinets. Searle could receive Chinese characters through a slot in the door, process them
according to the program’s instructions, and produce Chinese characters as output. If
the computer had passed the Turing test this way, it follows, says Searle, that he would
do so as well, simply by running the program manually, as shown in Figure 3.2.
Searle asserts that there is no essential difference between the roles of the computer
and himself in the experiment. Each simply follows a program, step-by-step, producing
a behavior which is then interpreted as demonstrating intelligent conversation. However,
Searle would not be able to understand the conversation. Therefore it follows that the
computer would not be able to understand the conversation either.
Searle argues that without “understanding” (or “intentionality”), we can not describe
what the machine is doing as “thinking” and since it does not think, it does not have
a “mind” in anything like the normal sense of the word. Therefore, he concludes that
“Strong AI” is false.
According to Searle’s argument, a program cannot give a computer a “mind”, “under-
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standing” or “consciousness”, regardless of how intelligently it may make it behave. The
argument is directed against the philosophical positions of functionalism and computa-
tionalism, which hold that the mind may be viewed as an information processing system
operating on formal symbols.
Searle (1997) describes consciousness as a biological problem. He refutes what Strong
AI states, that implementing the right software in any hardware might produce mental
states as emergent properties. For Searle, consciousness arises not from software, but
from the “hardware”, from organic biological brains, an organic machine. Consciousness,
according to the philosopher, “is caused by lower-level neuronal processes in the brain
and is itself a feature of the brain”.
3.1.3 Daniel Dennet - Denying Consciousness
Dennett (1991) states that there is no hard problem, the whole idea of the inner
subjective movie is nothing but an illusion or confusion. In Dennet’s view, if we are able
to explain the dynamics, functions and behaviors of the brain, then we have explained
everything that there is to be explained. To think otherwise would be as believing that,
inside the brain, in this privileged place, an “I” or a sort of homunculus would watch all
the mental representations like a spectator in a theater.
3.1.4 David Chalmers and the Naturalistic Dualism
Chalmers (1995, 1996) is a scientific materialist, but he argues that all forms of physi-
calism, whether reductive or non-reductive, that have dominated modern philosophy and
science, fail to account for the existence of consciousness itself. He views consciousness as
an anomaly that we can not integrate in our current view of the world. He proposes an
alternative dualistic view he calls naturalistic dualism, in which consciousness or “expe-
rience” is a fundamental building block, just as some aspects of the universe, like space,
time or mass in physics. These fundamental building blocks have properties and laws
that do not have an explanation as anything more basic. They are taken as primitives
and the world is built upon them. Chalmers argues that, just as Maxwell could not ex-
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Figure 3.3: Art representing the Homunculus hypothesis.
plain electromagnetism in the 19th century with the fundamentals space, time and mass
from Newtonian laws, and had to write new fundamentals, like charge, and develop the
laws that connected them to space, time and mass, so we must do to be able to explain
consciousness - postulate “experience” as a fundamental building block of nature. In this
view, just like space and time are universal, so would be “experience”, a property of any
system in nature, from photons to human brains, in different degrees, a panpsychic view.
One important concept that Chalmers put forward is the organizational invariance,
which states that if two systems have the same fine-grained functional organization, they
will also have qualitatively identical experiences. This principle predicts that computers
will be conscious, when they are able to replicate the functional organization of the hu-
man brain. Many philosophers maintain that consciousness merely depends on a specific
functional organization, which in turn does not rely on the characteristic structure of the
system or the “hardware”.
Chalmer’s theory confronts us with a new metaphysical viewpoint on nature. Ac-
cording to his theory, all information might have an intrinsic phenomenal aspect, so that
where there is simple information processing, there is also simple conscious experience,
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and where there is complex information processing, there is also complex conscious ex-
perience. This is the dualism in his theory, different from Descartes’ Cartesian dualism.
Since information is everywhere, we should conclude that consciousness too is, in different
degrees, everywhere. This position is called panpsychism by philosophers and considered
by many as a very counterintuitive conception of reality, as it is difficult to believe that a
thermostat may have a phenomenal experience whatsoever (Cavanna & Nani, 2014).
One important argument Chalmers developed to confront the idea that mind and brain
are one thing is the idea of what is called philosophical zombies. A philosophical zombie
is a perfect physical copy of a person, but with no inner conscious experience. Chalmers
argues that, since it is possible to conceive the idea of such a zombie, the relationship
between the conscious mind and brain is to be contingent rather than necessary. Some
philosophers accept this argument, while others take it as fallacious and misleading. Their
main point is that the argument is logically incoherent, because if mind and brain are
the same entity, then it is not coherently possible to imagine one without the other. In
other words, following the philosophical zombie argument would be similar to conceiving
a pencil that does not write. What kind of pencil would it be? And would it still be a
pencil?
3.2 Scientific Theories of Consciousness
3.2.1 Giulio Tononi - Consciousness as Integrated Information
Tononi (2008) developed the integrated information theory (IIT) in order to measure
consciousness as an integrated information property of matter. The author states that:
• consciousness is a specific process by which information is integrated;
• the quantity of consciousness corresponds to the amount of integrated information
generated by a complex of elements;
• the quality of experience is specified by the set of informational relationships gen-
erated within that complex;
3.2. Scientific Theories of Consciousness 55
• Integrated information (φ) is defined as the amount of information generated by a
complex of elements, above and beyond the information generated by its parts.
The author describes a different and new view of nature based on these assumptions.
Tononi’s view that every system has a measure φ of consciousness is a panpsychic view,
aligned with the idea of consciousness as a fundamental primitive of the universe, like
Chalmers states.
Figure 3.4 illustrates some results of the calculation of φ according to Tononi’s inte-
grated information theory relating to neuroanatomy, in A, B, C and D, and neurophysiol-
ogy, in E and F. The more integrated information and states a system is able to generate,
the greater is the measure φ of the system.
Tononi’s theory is currently reputed as one of the most promising theories in the
scientific community (Cavanna & Nani, 2014). It is believed that, if we can explain how
these little unities of consciousness add up from a microbe to a human mind, we are on
our way to fully explaining consciousness and integrating it in our scientific view of the
world.
3.2.2 Christof Koch, the Romantic Reductionist
Koch (2012) believes that consciousness is a fundamental, an elementary, property
of living matter that can not be derived from anything else - a simple substance. The
author believes that the property of consciousness arise not from the mechanism of how
the neuron works, but from how the network of neurons is organized, from its complexity.
The author refers to the measure of complexity φ from Tononi’s theory to state that
brains with a higher φ are somehow superior to brains that are less integrated.
3.2.3 Jeff Hawkins and the Memory Prediction Framework
According to Hawkins (2004), the brain is not a computer, but a memory system
that stores experiences in a way that reflects the true structure of the world, remember-
ing sequences of events and their nested relationships and making predictions based on
those memories. It is this memory-prediction system that forms the basis of intelligence,
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Figure 3.4: In A, computing φ in simple models of neuroanatomy suggests that a function-
ally integrated and functionally specialized network—like the corticothalamic system—is
well suited to generating high values of φ. In B, C and D, architectures modeled on
the cerebellum, afferent pathways, and cortical-subcortical loops give rise to complexes
containing more elements, but with reduced φ compared to the main corticothalamic
complex. In E, φ peaks in balanced states; if too many or too few elements are active,
φ collapses. In F, a bistable (“sleeping”) system (same as in E), φ collapses when the
number of firing elements (dotted line) is too high (high % activity), remains low during
the “DOWN” state (zero % activity), and only recovers at the onset of the next “UP”
state. Figure adapted from Tononi (2008).
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perception, creativity and consciousness.
The main points of the Memory-Prediction framework can be summarized as follows:
1. The neocortex is constructing a model for the spatial and temporal patterns that
it is exposed to. The goal of this model construction is the prediction of the next
pattern on the input.
2. The cortex is constructed by replicating a basic computational unit known as the
canonical cortical circuit. From a computational point of view, this canonical circuit
can be treated as a node that is replicated several times.
3. The cortex is organized as a hierarchy. This means that the nodes – the basic
computational units – are connected in a tree shaped hierarchy.
4. The cortex function is to model the world that it is exposed to. This model is built
using a spatial and temporal hierarchy by memorizing patterns and sequences at
every node of the hierarchy. This model is then used to make predictions about the
input.
5. The neocortex builds its model of the world in an unsupervised manner.
6. Each node in the hierarchy stores a large number of patterns and sequences. The
pattern recognition method employed by the cortex is largely based on storing lots
of patterns.
7. The output of a node is in terms of the sequences of patterns it has learned.
8. Information is passed up and down in the hierarchy to recognize and disambiguate
information and propagated forward in time to predict the next input pattern.
To illustrate the differences between a computer and this memory-prediction system,
Hawkins uses the example of the task of catching a ball. He argues that this seems to be
a simple task for humans, until they try to program a robot arm to do the same. It is
actually nearly impossible. When engineers or computer scientists approach the problem,
they try to calculate the flight of the ball to determine where it will be when it reaches
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Figure 3.5: In A, three simple prototypes of binary images of a dog, a helicopter and a
table lamp are shown in the left, and nine variations of these in the right. In B, Euclidean
distances between the prototypes and the variations are shown. The closest prototype
is the one that is at minimum distance from the image. If we use Euclidean distance as
a measure of similarity, most of the images are misclassified. Image 4, which is actually
a helicopter, will be classified as a table lamp. It can be concluded from this plot that
a Euclidean distance measure does not inform us about perceptual similarity. Figure
adapted from George (2008).
the arm. This requires solving a set of simple equations. Second, all the joints of a robotic
arm have to be adjusted to move the hand in the proper position. A set of mathematical
equations more difficult than the first ones have to be solved. Finally, this algorithm has
to be repeated multiple times, as the ball approaches. It will require millions of steps in
order to catch the ball, which would be impossible for a biological brain to perform in
seconds. Hawkins believes the brain does it using memory and invariant representations,
which handle variations in the world automatically. Retrieving a memory is much faster
than computing millions of steps. However,the problem of understanding how the cortex
form invariant representations is yet to be solved.
Figure 3.5 illustrates how the problem of invariant representations, so well resolved by a
4 years old human brain, is far from trivial computationally. In A, three simple prototypes
of binary images of a dog, a helicopter and a table lamp are shown in the left, and nine
variations of these in the right. In B, Euclidean distances between the prototypes and
3.2. Scientific Theories of Consciousness 59
the variations are shown. The closest prototype is the one that is at minimum distance
from the image. If we use Euclidean distance as a measure of similarity, most of the
images are misclassified. Image 4, which is actually a helicopter, will be classified as a
table lamp. Human brains somehow store an invariant representation of objects like dogs,
helicopters and table lamps, and are very good at classifying them in real time, no matter
how distorted, cut or broken they are. According to Hawkins’ theory, the brain does so
by retrieving invariant representations and predicting patterns all the time.
For Hawkins, prediction is the most important feature of the brain, the essence of
intelligence. He states that prediction, not behavior generation, is the real advantage that
the neocortex brought to humans: seeing some steps into the future gives great advantage
to our species. The neocortex use basically memories and invariant representations to
predict.
Consciousness, in this memory-prediction framework, is seen by Hawkins as “what
it feels like to have a cortex”, that is, the subjective experience of being able to recall
memories and make predictions, that can also be used as inputs to other predictions, and
so on.
The Memory-Prediction framework, as expressed in Hawkins (2004), is a biological
theory. George (2008) worked on the foundation established by Hawkins and developed
the algorithmic and mathematical counterparts of the Memory-Prediction framework,
called Hierarchical Temporal Memory (HTM). The author also developed a set of algo-
rithms to deal with learning and invariant recognition for hierarchical-temporal data, a
theory for analysis of generalization in hierarchical-temporal models and a mathematical
model for cortical microcircuits.
3.2.4 Bernard J. Baars and The Dynamic Global Workspace
Theory
Bernard Baars has developed one of the most “implementable” theories in conscious-
ness studies. The Global Workspace Theory (GWT) (Baars, 1988; Edelman et al., 2011;
Baars et al., 2013) is largely inspired by the “blackboard model” from the beginning of
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artificial intelligence (Nii, 1986). Due to its computational origins, it is, among other
consciousness theories, one which is particularly interesting for deriving computational
models, being very popular in the field of “machine consciousness”. GWT suggests that
only one integrated sensory content can be dominant in the brain in a given moment.
Unconscious content compete for access to the limited capacity of this workspace. This
dominant content is then broadcasted to other regions of the brain, in a nervous system
seen as a set of massive distributed small networks with specialized purpose. In such
a system, coordination, control and resolution of new problems take place with the ex-
change of centralized information. This theory tries to conciliate the limited capacity of
conscious content with the vast repertoire of long term memories. It states that the lim-
ited capacity of conscious content brings advantages to animal survival, because it helps
the animal to focus in what is most important in a given critical situation. The most
recent version of GWT is called Dynamic GWT, since it fits the evidence for conscious
cognition in the cortex. The concept of a dynamic core provides a mechanism for events
in the Global Workspace, as it projects brain signals in the cortex in a reentrant manner
(Edelman et al., 2011; Baars et al., 2013).
According to this model, consciousness is like an information gateway to the brain,
because it allows a widespread structure of neuronal networks to operate in order to in-
tegrate, provide access, and coordinate the processing of many specialized brain sites,
which would otherwise operate autonomously. This widespread architecture of neuronal
networks has been described by Baars using the metaphor of the global workspace the-
ater, a sort of cognitive stage in which mental functioning occurs at both conscious and
unconscious level. Within this picture, consciousness would be like a spotlight on the
stage of working memory, guided by selective attention.
In the GWT, the unconscious processes have a very important role. These processes
remain in the dark or “behind the scenes” and their activity is, accordingly, invisible. They
are however able to influence and orient consciousness. Baars calls these invisible brain
processes contexts, which are coalitions of unconscious processes relatively stable in time.
Some examples are the executive functions, which operate like the theater director; the
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linguistic modules, which can be compared to scriptwriters. The dorsal cortical stream
of the visual system, which shapes vision like stagehands shape the theatrical scenery.
Despite this hidden activity, a thought or a content of experience must always enter the
global workspace or, metaphorically speaking, be on the theater stage in order to be
conscious.
Since neuroimaging studies have shown how the conscious mind involves the activation
of widespread neuronal networks, Baars’ global workspace model has gained increasing
attention within the neuroscientific community. The model has therefore been developed
not only in its theoretical aspects but also and especially within a neuroanatomical context
(Cavanna & Nani, 2014).
3.3 The Global Workspace Algorithm
In order to understand the GWT algorithm, that is, how consciousness works in the
brain, according to Baars’ theory, the metaphor of the interactive theater is of special
interest (see Figure 3.6). In this metaphor, consciousness works like an interactive theater
play. In this theater, we find a big silent audience surrounding a center stage, where all
activities take place. There are many things going on at the stage, but just a selected part
of the stage is illuminated by a spotlight. The workers under the spotlight can be viewed
by all those at the audience and at the stage. At any point, a member of the audience,
looking at what is going on under the spotlight, might be compelled to do some work. It
then moves to the stage and starts its performance. By finishing its performance, it comes
back to its place at the audience. During the workers performance, there is an intrinsic
competition for the spotlight at the stage. Those workers at the stage who cry louder might
attract attention from the spotlight manager, and gain access to the light. Once they gain
the light, they can be seen by all other agents both at the audience and at the stage. The
play is a never ending play. Agents can go down to stage, develop their performance,
and return to the audience many times. Once they are at the stage, they are intrinsically
competing for the spotlight. Once a performer gains the spotlight it can be seen by all the
others, which might be compelled by its activity, to go to stage and start performing on
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Figure 3.6: Baars’ interactive theater. The audience is shown as light yellow circles in the
purple area, and the stage in gray with red and orange actors. The bigger the circles, the
more activated they are. The dark yellow area is the area under the spotlight, representing
the conscious processes, which broadcast their information.
their own. This process goes on indefinitely. In this metaphor, the agents are independent
brain processes. Those processes at the audience, together with those processes at the
stage who are not at the spotlight (the “context”) are unconscious processes. While they
are silent at the audience or doing something at the stage, they are all unconscious. Only
those at the spotlight are said to be conscious. Conscious processes have the unique
characteristic of being able to influence silent unconscious processes to perform some
activity. Any process might become conscious for some time, while performing at the stage
and attracting the attention of the spotlight manager. Processes can become unconscious
or conscious, at any time. The stage represents the working memory - brain processes
and information ready and close to becoming conscious.
Brain processes are able to collaborate to each other. While doing a collaborative
work they are said to integrate a coalition. Coalitions can be formed and dissolved while
agents are compelled to work due to what is going on at the spotlight. When many agents
are collaborating together, their voice becomes louder, as a group, and there is a greater
chance of being chosen by the spotlight manager. In GWT, conscious content is the result
of coalitions being identified as important or particularly relevant in a given instant of
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time. This illustrates the limited and serial capacity of consciousness.
In conclusion, GWT states that there is a global workspace formed by a dominant
coalition of contexts. This core is dynamic, in a sense that it is not localized in a specific
region of the brain, but it moves around according to the activation of the small networks
in the brain, as if it was a serialization of the parallel activity in the brain. This idea leads
us to our definition of Machine Consciousness, which will be presented in section 3.5.
3.4 State of the Art in Applications of the GWT
3.4.1 Stan Franklin and the Learning Intelligent Distribution
Agent (LIDA)
Stan Franklin’s research group, from the University of Memphis, was the first to de-
velop a machine consciousness algorithm inspired in the Global Workspace Theory (Baars,
1988). This algorithm was applied with success to solve different problems such as the
creation of a virtual personal secretary (C-Mattie), an American Navy tasks planner (IDA
- Intelligent Distribution Agent) and an intelligent tutor system to train Canadian astro-
nauts on how to operate a mechanical arm for the International Space Station (Bogner,
1999; Negatu, 2006; Dubois, 2007).
Based in his previous experience in developing systems with consciousness, Franklin
evolved the LIDA architecture (Learning Intelligent Distribution Agent) (Baars & Franklin,
2009; Franklin et al., 2014a), as both a conceptual and computational model grounded
mainly in the GWT (Baars, 1988).
The LIDA model and its architecture are based in a cognitive cycle that can be di-
vided in three phases: perception, interpretation and action. An agent’s life can thus be
seen as a continuous sequence of such cognitive cycles. The architecture uses many com-
putational mechanisms known in the literature, such as the Copycat Architecture (Hof-
stadter & Mitchell, 1994), Sparse Distributed Memory (Kanerva, 1988), Schema Mecha-
nism (Drescher, 1991) and Behavior Net (Maes, 1989). The LIDA model is presented in
Figure 3.7.
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Figure 3.7: The LIDA model
Franklin’s LIDA makes heavy use of the concept of Codelets. Codelets, following Hof-
stadter & Mitchell (1994), are small pieces of non-blocking code, each of them executing
a well defined and simple task. The idea of a codelet is of a piece of code which ideally
shall be executed continuously and cyclically, time after time, being responsible for the
behavior of a system’s independent component running in parallel. A codelet can be seen
as a nervous system basic functional unit, like the cortical column Mountcastle (1978)
first described. In computational systems, codelets are scalable nodes in a network.
Coalitions are groups of one or more codelets. Coalitions are formed by codelets that
sum their skills in order to perform more complex tasks, which they would not be able to
perform by themselves in an isolated manner.
In the perception phase, sensory stimuli are grabbed from the internal and external
environment and stored in the Sensory Memory. These stimuli work as cues for the
Perceptual Associative Memory, which will give rise to Percepts in the Current Situational
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Model. This mechanism works as follows. When one stimulus is identified as relevant,
one node in the Perceptual Associative Memory receives a greater activation. This node
passes on this activation to other related nodes, called links. When this process stabilizes,
the node group that received sufficient activation is referenced as a Percept and moved to
the Current Situational Model. During this stabilization phase, the Percept is seen as a
group of ontology elements relevant to the stimulus. It is written as a binary vector called
a cue, that is later used to search for an autobiographical memory, a declarative memory,
and a transient episodic memory. The transient episodic memory has information about
events that the agent remembers. The declarative memory has information learned during
lifetime, including some pieces of information which were once in the transient memory.
The search return new cues, that are in turn used for a new search. This process repeats
itself until a new information is returned.
During the interpretation phase, the percept created and stabilized in the perception
phase is copied to the long term working memory, in a workspace secondary partition,
where it will join older percepts. Attention Codelets analyze long term working memory
content, searching for interesting elements. Coalitions of attention codelets and percepts
are formed whenever it is possible. The coalition with greatest activation wins and its
content is moved to the Global Workspace to be broadcasted.
In the action phase, the conscious broadcast goes to each agent’s subsystem, including
the Procedural Memory. The Procedural Memory is a collection of organized schemes in
the form of a scheme net. When the conscious broadcast provides information that com-
bines the context of one or more schemes, the procedural memory will suggest schemes
that should be copied to the action selection model. The action selection model, imple-
mented as a Behaviour Net, will chose which action is most appropriated for the context
in place. The action is sent to the Sensory-Motor Memory, that will execute the action
in the environment.
In da Silva (2009), our research group investigated the LIDA model. This was our
first contact with the GWT. The work suggested that this mechanism is in fact capable
of promoting an executive summary of the perception, and the automatization of new
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behaviours.
3.4.2 Dehaenne and the Excitatory Neurons Model
Dehaene & Naccache (2001) also proposed a cognitive architecture with a Global
Workspace. In their model, sensory stimuli mobilize excitatory neurons by means of
cortico-cortical axons, giving rise to activity patterns in the workspace neurons.
3.4.3 Shanahan and the Imagination Architecture
Shanahan (2006) proposed a cognitive architecture with concepts of consciousness,
imagination and emotion. Shanahan adopts an information flow model based on the
GWT. The planning in his model is realized by means of internal simulations, resembling
the imagination process in the brain.
3.5 Our Definition of Machine Consciousness
The concept of machine consciousness we adopted in this work, to be used hereafter,
is the following, depicted in Figure 3.8: machine consciousness is the emergence of a serial
integrated information flow on top of a group of parallel interactive devices (Dennett,
1991; da Silva, 2009; Baars & Franklin, 2009).
The reader might be conjecturing by this time, what does the interactive theater
metaphor and the GWT algorithm have to do with the notion of consciousness. Let’s
make a brief analysis of the GWT algorithm and its consequences. Assuming the brain
processes as a large set of parallel devices which remain silent for some time, but perform
some activity from time to time, the spotlight manager works like a serialization process
on top of this network of parallel devices. By focusing attention step by step in different
devices, the spotlight manager makes it emerge something which might be compared to
what William James refers as the “stream of consciousness”. For most of the time, what is
appearing to consciousness (what is at the spotlight) are perceptual processes, abstract-
ing some particular pattern identified at the sensory space. But from time to time, some
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Figure 3.8: Machine consciousness is the emergence of a serial integrated information flow
on top of a group of parallel interactive devices.
memory processes gain access to consciousness, and we remember something which is im-
portant. After that, some planning activity might gain the consciousness, and a sequence
of possible future actions are being broadcasted through consciousness. Depending on
what is going on, perceptual processes start to gain again access to consciousness, and
we see that a serial flow of brain processes start to emerge as the effect of a coordination
process.
Machine consciousness can be seen then as a special algorithm in a parallel network of
processes, which is capable to coordinate such processes in a way leading to the emergence
of a serial flow, where the most important or relevant piece of information is available,
and made broadcast to all other processes. This creates order in a potentially chaotic
manifold of information, emphasizing the information which is, at each time instant, the
most relevant in driving future system behavior.
This coordinative characteristic of machine consciousness, emphasizing relevance at
each timestep, is essential for us to understand its utility in computational systems.
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Chapter 4
The Cognitive Systems Toolkit
The last theoretical issue we will cover as a background to our thesis is the domain
of cognitive architectures. This issue started to arouse as an offspring on the study of
intelligent agents. We can understand a Cognitive Architecture as the reuse of specific
cognitively inspired strategies and designs in the pursue of a control architecture for an
intelligent agent (Langley et al., 2009; Samsonovich, 2012a). These architectures are a
special kind of control system that use inspiration on how cognitive functions from the
human (or animal) mind might be computationally implemented and used to provide
intelligence to an artificial agent.
In section 4.1, we provide an overview on the concept of cognitive architectures and
cite the most classical approaches. In section 4.2, we present the CST - Cognitive Systems
Toolkit, a toolkit being developed by our research group, which we used as the main basis
for the construction of the cognitive architecture controlling our traffic lights.
4.1 Cognitive Architectures
Cognitive architectures are control systems inspired by scientific theories developed to
explain cognition in humans and animals. Cognitive Architectures have been employed
in many different kinds of applications, since the control of robots to decision-making
processes in intelligent agents. Usually, a cognitive architecture is composed by modules
implementing cognitive capabilities, like perception, attention, memory, reasoning, learn-
ing, behavior generation, etc. Cognitive Architectures are, at the same time, theoretical
models for how different cognitive processes interact to each other in order to sense, rea-
son and act, and also a software framework which can be reused throughout different
applications. An example of a typical cognitive architecture is given in Figure 4.1, taken
from Franklin & Graesser (1997).
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Figure 4.1: A Typical Cognitive Architecture, reproduced from Franklin & Graesser
(1997).
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There are some classical cognitive architectures described in the literature, such as
SOAR (State, Operator And Result) (Laird, 2008) and ACT-R (Atomic Components of
Thought) (Anderson et al., 2004). Even though these architectures have their roots on
rule based systems, they recently evolved to become full cognitive architectures. SOAR
was originally proposed by John Laird, Allen Newell and Paul Rosembloom, starting
around 1983 and is in constant development, evolving through many different versions.
More recently, many specialized architectures were proposed (see Samsonovich (2012b)
for a comprehensive table), such as CLARION (Connectionist Learning with Adaptive
Rule Induction ON-line) (Sun, 2006) and LIDA (Learning Intelligent Distribution Agent)
(Baars & Franklin, 2009), emphasizing different aspects of human and animal cognition,
like emotion, attention, memory, consciousness and language. LIDA is an evolution of a
previous cognitive architecture called IDA, which was proposed by Stan Franklin around
the 90’s based on Bernard Baars’ Global Workspace Theory. CLARION was proposed by
Ron Sun also in the 90’s and was recently restructured.
Each one of these architectures has advantages and disadvantages, when compared
to each other. Lucentini & Gudwin (2015) presented a theoretical analysis comparing
SOAR, LIDA and CLARION, three of the most popular cognitive architectures, which
have a long tradition of development in their research groups. The methodology used
by the authors considered input data/perception (how is sensor data processed and un-
derstood?), goals (how do goals and motivations influence on action selection?), action
selection (how to choose the best action in the short and long term?) and learning (which
are the learning mechanisms and how do they help the agent in order to take an action?).
The authors’ comparison shows similarities and differences among the architectures, iden-
tifying advantages and disadvantages to advise a potential user on how to choose the best
architecture to employ, depending on the situation.
The most popular cognitive architectures usually have their code available at the Inter-
net (with different kinds of licenses), such that different researchers are able to download
this code and make experiments with these architectures.
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4.2 Cognitive Systems Toolkit
There are mainly two kinds of cognitive architectures: frameworks and toolkits. Frame-
works provide reuse of previous designs by reapplying the same code in new applications.
Toolkits provide a more flexible kind of reuse, when particular cognitive functions and
strategies can be chosen in order to build up customized architectures. In this work, we
were part of the team which designed and implemented the foundations of the Cognitive
Systems Toolkit (CST), and collaborated in the development of a neuroscience inspired
cognitive architecture (Raizer et al., 2012), with applications to robotics and assistive
technology (Raizer et al., 2013b). Moreover, we specifically extended CST by including
a GWT-based consciousness subsystem, and applied it in the implementation of a traffic
light controller, what constitutes the main focus of this thesis.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the core of the CST toolkit. Basically, the CST is a toolkit
for the construction of specialized cognitive architectures. However, all cognitive archi-
tectures built with the help of CST share this common core of structures and concepts.
Even though different strategies might be chosen for implementing cognitive functions
like perception, memory, action selection, etc, these cognitive functions necessarily will
be constructed with the help of this common core. We will be referring to this generic
kind of cognitive architecture, being constructed using CST, as a CST Architecture. The
two basic concepts, fundamental for understanding a CST Architecture, are the concepts
of “Memory Object” and “Codelet”. Memory objects are any kind of data structure used
to store information and/or knowledge. Using a semiotic terminology, we might refer
generically to a memory object as being a “sign”. A memory object has a type T, and an
encoding of information I. This information can be a single measurement, expressed by a
number, or a complex data container, which structure is completely defined by the defini-
tion of its type T. Codelets are small pieces of non-blocking code, executing a well defined
and simple task. The prototype of a codelet is a piece of code which ideally shall be
executed continuously and cyclically, time after time, being responsible for the behavior
of an independent component of a system running in parallel. The notion of codelet was
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Figure 4.2: The CST Core subsystem
introduced originally by Hofstadter & Mitchell (1994) and further enhanced by Franklin
et al. (1998). The CST architecture is “codelet oriented”, since all main cognitive func-
tions are implemented as codelets. This means that, from a conceptual point of view, any
CST-implemented system is a fully parallel asynchronous multi-agent system, where each
agent is modeled by a codelet. CST’s codelets are implemented much in the same manner
as in the LIDA cognitive architecture (Franklin et al., 2014a) and largely correspond to
the special-purpose processes described by Baar’s Global Workspace Theory (Baars &
Franklin, 2007). Nevertheless, for the system to work, a kind of coordination must ex-
ist among codelets, forming coalitions which by means of a coordinated interaction, are
able to implement the cognitive functions ascribed to the architecture. This coordination
constraint imposes special restrictions while implementing codelets in a serial computer.
In a real parallel system, a codelet would simply be called in a loop, being responsible to
implement the behavior of a parallel component.
A codelet has two main inputs (which are characterized as In and B in Figure 4.2),
a local input (In) and a global input (B). The local input is used for the codelet to get
information from memory objects, which are available at Raw Memory. The global input
is used for the codelet to get information from the global workspace mechanism (Baars
& Franklin, 2007). Information coming from global workspace is variable at each instant
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of time, and is usually in the form of a summary, which works as an executive filter to
select the most relevant pieces of information available in memory at each time-step. The
two outputs of a codelet are a standard output (Out), which is used to change or create
new information in the Raw Memory, and the activation level (A), which indicates the
relevance of the information provided at the output. This activation level is also used by
the consciousness mechanism in order to select information to be destined to the global
workspace.
In order to dig deeper in the details, we invite you to visit our Java implementation of
the CST and its Core subsystem, released as open source software, at https://github.
com/CST-Group/cst. Figure 4.3 is an Unified Modeling Language (UML) representation
of part of the Core subsystem code just referred.
In this implementation, Codelet is an abstract class with three main abstract methods
that must be overridden when the class is extended, shown in code below:
abstract class Codelet implements Runnable {
/**
* This method is used in every Codelet to capture input, broadcast and output MemoryObjects
* which shall be used in the proc() method.
* This abstract method must be implemented by the developer. Here, the developer must get the inputs and outputs it needs to perform
proc.
*/
abstract void accessMemoryObjects();
/**
* This abstract method must be implemented by the developer. Here, the developer must calculate the activation of the codelet before it
does what it
* is supposed to do in proc();
*/
abstract void calculateActivation();
/**
* Main Codelet function, to be implemented in each subclass.
*/
abstract void proc();
}
Whenever building new kinds of codelet, in a cognitive architecture built upon CST,
the developer only needs to extend the Codelet abstract class and implement these three
methods. All the rest is already taken care in the rest of the class implementation, already
provided. Indeed, the only thing a developer needs to do in order to build a full CST
Architecture is to develop new kinds of codelets or use the ones already provided by CST.
The CST toolkit provides a Reference Architecture, with different kinds of codelets to
perform most of the cognitive functions available at a cognitive architecture, as indicated
in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.3: Our Java implementation of the CST Core subsystem
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Figure 4.4: The CST Reference Architecture
We call it a Reference Architecture because it is an abstract view of how to organize
a set of codelets and a set of memory objects, in order to build a cognitive architecture.
Codelets are organized into groups, each group responsible for implementing a cognitive
model of some cognitive function. The CST toolkit provides standard implementations
for some of these groups. Other codelets will be available in the future, as CST imple-
mentation evolves. New types of codelets can be created by the cognitive architect, and
easily bound together using CST core functions. Figure 4.4 is a refined view of Figure 4.2,
where codelets groups are indicated. Also, memory objects are scattered among many
different kinds of memories. The Raw Memory is so split into many different memory
systems, which are used to store and access different kinds of knowledge. The following
kinds of memories are prescribed by CST Reference Architecture:
Sensory Memory
The Sensory Memory is the raw storage of information coming from visual, auditive,
olfactory, tactile and other sensory modalities in a time window which generally spans over
something as 50-500 ms (Baddeley, 1997). This memory usually comprises uninterpreted
data which is used in the first steps of perception. There are at least two kinds of sensory
4.2. Cognitive Systems Toolkit 76
memory, the Iconic Memory, storing visual pattern stimulus and the Echoic Memory,
storing auditory stimulus, but there might be also other memories for other senses as
well, not so widely investigated.
This memory holds Memory Objects carrying direct representations of system sensors.
These Memory Objects can be simple numbers or very complex data structures, represent-
ing both scalar sensors or n-dimensional images, according to the information provided
by a sensor. It might also store temporal sequences of sensor data, which can be used
by Perceptual Codelets to create more elaborate percepts. More elaborated or derived
representations from direct sensory capture are not stored here, but at the Perceptual
Memory. The Memory Objects stored in the Sensory Memory are usually updated by
Sensory Codelets.
Perceptual Memory
The Perceptual Memory is the memory of categories of things which can be perceived
by a Perceptual System. It includes different things, attributes and patterns which can
be categorized by a perceptual system. Each instance of a perceptual memory is a repre-
sentation of a category used during perception.
Perceptual Memory Objects comprises usually some abstraction or high level represen-
tation of items of reality. They are usually called in cognitive science as Percepts. There
might be many different possible ways for representing percepts, like fuzzy sets, patterns,
objects and other more elaborate representations. Usually, the Perceptual Memory also
holds representations for categories of things. Usually, Perceptual Memory is fed by Per-
ceptual Codelets, which collect information from Sensory Memory Objects and provide
high-level abstractions of sensory data in terms of percepts. Many other categories of
codelets, though, may use Perceptual Memory Objects as a source of information.
Episodic Memory
The Episodic Memory (which should not be confused with the Episodic Buffer in
Working Memory) is used to store facts particularly contextualized in time and space,
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forming Episodes which refer to information specific to a particular location and time
frame. Episodes are representations for scenes detected from environment, using a higher
level abstraction of space-time. We can see an episode as a specific representation for a
segment of space-time, where some specific set of objects, and their trajectory in their
state space is somewhat represented.
Episodic Memory is a neurocognitive mechanism for accessing time delimited contex-
tualized information that naturally makes part of the human process of decision making,
usually enhancing the chances of a successful behavior. This assertion is supported by
several human psychological researches which indicate that the knowledge of his/her per-
sonal history enhances one’s person ability to accomplish several cognitive capabilities
in the context of sensing, reasoning and learning (Tulving, 1991; Baddeley, 2000, 2002;
Tulving, 2002; Howard et al., 2005; Cabeza et al., 2008).
Episodes may be State-based Episodes or Scene-based Episodes. State-based episodes
encode the episode as sequences of an agent’s states (including environmental sensed
states). State-based episodes are easier to store, but more difficult to be used by higher-
level cognitive functions. In most artificial systems, state-based episodes are the standard
approach usually adopted, since its implementation is easier. However, the actual use of
state-based episodes in sophisticated applications is difficult, implying restrictions of its
applicability to specific kinds of applications. State-based episodes are raw data, as they
appear in the Working Memory. There might be a better way of storing this data than
just storing everything.
Scene-based Episodes encode a time-space segment as a scene. In this scene, there are
objects which were consciously perceived by the agent, and an action, performed by the
agent itself or other agents appearing in the scene. Scene-based Episodes can be viewed
as interpreted versions of state-based episodes. They are easier to be used by high-level
cognitive functions, as they already segment the scene into discrete elements, which are
playing their own role in the scene dynamics. At the same time, they are more difficult to
be implemented in artificial systems, because they require a process of interpretation of
sensory information in order to discover the objects and actions being performed at the
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environment.
In addition, episodes can also be autobiographical and non-autobiographical. Auto-
biographical episodes are those episodes where the agent itself is performing the action
being described in the episode. On the contrary, on non-autobiographical episodes, the
subject of the action is another agent. In this case, these actions are being observed by
the current agent and memorized as something seen, but not done by the agent itself.
Working Memory
The Working Memory is a volatile kind of memory used during perception, reasoning,
planning and other cognitive functions. Its capacity in time and space is very short, rang-
ing from 4 to 9 items, and periods up to a few dozen seconds (Miller, 1956; Baddeley et al.,
1975; Cowan, 2001). According to Baddeley (1997, 2000), there are at least three subsys-
tems involved in the implementation of a Working Memory, the Visuo-spatial Sketchpad,
the Phonological Loop and the Episodic Buffer, coordinated by a Central Executive which
intermediates between them. Regarding brain localization, the regions related to working
memory processes are very overlapping, however recent researches point the prefrontal
cortex and basal ganglia as being crucial (Braver et al., 1997; Frank et al., 2001; McNab
& Klingberg, 2008).
Visual Sketchpad
The Visual Sketchpad serves the function of integrating spatial, visual and possibly
kinesthetic information into a unified representation which may be temporarily stored and
manipulated (Baddeley, 1997). In the Visual Sketchpad we usually have Memory Objects
representing maps of the environment, or more elaborate representations, where multiple
locations are connected forming a whole network. These Memory Objects can be used by
Planning codelets in order to derive a plan of actions.
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Phonologic Loop
The Phonologic Loop comprises a temporary verbal-acoustic storage system which is
assumed to be necessary, for example, for the immediate retention of sequences of digits,
or words in a phrase (Baddeley, 1997). Despite its name inspired in speech recognition,
the Phonologic Loop can store any kind of sequence detected in episodes: sequences of
numbers, sequences of words, sequences of situations detected at the environment, etc.
Episodic Buffer
The Episodic Buffer is a limited capacity storage buffer which binds together informa-
tion from a number of different sources into chunks or episodes, combining information
from different modalities into a single multi-faceted code in order to be processed by the
Central Executive (Baddeley, 2000).
The Episodic Buffer comprises the detection of episodes at the environment, as they
are happening. The information on the Episodic Buffer is an abstract representation of
the perceived present. The structures in the Episodic Buffer are the episodes which will
later be stored in the Episodic Memory, in a sequence, forming a continuous timeline
where we can recover episodes from the past.
Semantic Memory
The Semantic Memory is used to record facts of general kind, not contextualized in
time and space. Usually, Memory Objects in the Semantic Memory are sentences: strings
of characters comprising general facts.
Procedural Memory
The Procedural Memory is the memory of actions and behaviors of a system. It is a
non-declarative memory which refers to a “how to” kind of information, usually consisting
of a record of possible motor and behavioral skills. Typical examples of Memory Objects
in the Procedural Memory are behavioral rules.
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Motor Memory
The Motor Memory is a dual of the Sensory Memory, but now for the system’s actu-
ators. Memory Objects in the Motor Memory are usually actuator values, which will be
used as parameters by Motor Codelets in order to actuate at the environment.
Global Workspace (Consciousness)
Finally, the Global Workspace, represented as a star labeled Consciousness in Figure
4.4 is a virtual kind of memory. Instead of storing its own set of Memory Objects, the
Global Workspace is just a collection of references to other Memory Objects stored in
the different memories described before. This is the reason it is represented as a star,
because it is constantly being changed, by the consciousness mechanism implemented by
the Consciousness codelets.
Using the available codelets, different cognitive architectures, using different strategies
for modeling different cognitive capabilities, can be composed in order to perform the role
necessary to address a specific control problem. These codelets are constructed according
to different techniques in intelligent systems, like neural networks, fuzzy systems, evolu-
tionary computation, rule-based systems, Bayesian networks, etc., which are integrated
into a whole control and monitoring system.
The definition and choice of a particular cognitive architecture is constructed using a
composition of different kinds of codelets, according to the control problem under analysis.
Depending on the problem to be addressed, different strategies might be necessary or
useful, depending on the problem constraints. Our Reference Architecture groups codelets
in the following categories:
Sensory Codelets
Sensory codelets are codelets which are responsible for grabbing information from
sensors at the environment, and feeding the corresponding Memory Objects which might
hold the sensors values. Depending on the applications (e.g. robotic applications), sensory
codelets will be really reading the sensor values and creating a corresponding representa-
4.2. Cognitive Systems Toolkit 81
tion. In other applications (as e.g. in a video-game or a virtual world), sensory codelets
will open sockets to other computer applications and will simulate the acquisition of data
from the environment.
Perceptual Codelets
Perceptual codelets are responsible for generating percepts, or high-level representa-
tions for things at the environment. Usually they are fed by Memory Objects at the
Sensory Memory, and will feed Memory Objects at the Perception Memory.
Attention Codelets
Attention codelets are specialized kinds of codelets which will work as salience detec-
tors for objects, situations, events or episodes happening at the environment which might
be important for defining an action strategy, or behavior. Usually they grab information
from Memory Objects at the Perceptual Memory, and usually feed Memory Objects at
the own Perceptual Memory or the Working Memory.
Emotional Codelets
The concept of emotion, as brought from cognitive psychology and philosophy, was
suggested in the literature, as an alternative way of dealing with the problem of behavior
generation (Bates et al., 1994; Reilly, 1996; Picard, 1997; Canamero, 1997, 1998; Sept-
seault & Nédélec, 2005; Budakova & Dakovski, 2006; Meyer, 2006).
There is no consensus, though, on what exactly are emotions. Different approaches
have different views for what it is and how to model them. For example, Ortony et al.
(1998) view emotions as “valenced reactions to events, agents, or objects, with their par-
ticular nature being determined by the way in which the eliciting situation is construed”.
Sloman (1998, 2001) understand emotions as internal “alarms” which give a momentary
emphasis to certain groups of signals. Damasio (1994, 1999) make a distinction between
“emotions”, which affect the body and “feelings”, which are a cognitive introspection of an
emotion. Other authors may have further different views for what emotions are. For some
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of them, emotions work like “amplifiers” for motivations. For others they are homeostatic
processes related to physiological variables (Canamero, 1997). Some authors, instead of a
single concept of emotion, develop a complex “emotional system”, where many different
concepts like “motivations”, “drives”, “impulses”, “affections”, “needs” and other terms
are used to represent different aspects of this emotional system.
Emotional Codelets can be used to derive Cognitive Architectures modeling some of
these emotional systems. Particularly, the Activation meta-information in codelets, and
the Evaluation meta-information in Memory Objects can be used to implement these
emotional mechanisms.
Learning Codelets
Learning is one of the most important capabilities of cognition. Different cognitive
architectures report many different kinds of learning (Lucentini & Gudwin, 2015). For
example, SOAR (Laird, 2012) reports 4 different kinds of learning: Chunking, Reinforce-
ment Learning, Semantic Learning and Episodic Learning. The LIDA architecture reports
6 different kinds of learning: Perceptual Learning, Sensory Motor Learning, Spatial Learn-
ing, Episodic Learning, Procedural Learning and Attentional Learning (Franklin et al.,
2014b). Clarion (Sun, 2003) also cites many different kinds of learning: bottom-up learn-
ing (RER - Rule Extraction Refinement, IRL - Independent Rule Learning), top-down
learning (Learning Explicit Knowledge, Learning Implicit Knowledge), neural networks
learning (Q-Learning, Backpropagation), imitative learning, etc.
Many different learning strategies can be used with CST. Even though CST does not
emphasize any particular kind of learning, this learning should be provided by a learning
codelet. New kinds of learning can be included, as soon as there are a specific kind of
memory object which needs to be learned.
Language Codelets
Language is one of the unique capabilities of human beings, while compared to other
cognitive abilities shared with other species of animals (Deacon, 1998). Recently, evidences
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that there are two subsystems in the brain responsible for language were discovered (Ardila
et al., 2011), one responsible for grounding the meaning of isolated symbols (or words) and
the other responsible for what is called grammatical language. The study on the simulation
of language evolution has brought the attention on the importance of Language Games in
order to construct the meaning of language in artificial agents (Steels, 2015; Vogt, 2015).
Language codelets are responsible for implementing specific behaviors enabling the
agent controlled by a cognitive architecture implemented through CST to engage into
interactions to other agents, in order to play a language game. An example of such
application is reported in de Paula & Gudwin (2015).
Consciousness Codelets
Even though the topic of machine consciousness is still very controversial in the com-
munity (Gamez, 2009), one of the most popular approaches involves the implementation of
Global Workspace Theory (GWT) from Baars (1988). Baars’ theory has been implemented
in the LIDA cognitive architecture (Franklin et al., 2012), but also by others (Shanahan,
2006; Dubois et al., 2008). In CST, we would like to provide the cognitive architect with
many different possible theories of consciousness. Due to that, the consciousness mech-
anism is not a built-in mechanism, but a mechanism which is implemented by means of
consciousness codelets. It is true that these codelets make use of features provided by
CST core, like the global input in codelets, which allow the broadcast required in GWT.
The current implementation of CST provides a set of codelets which implements GWT in
a way very similar to LIDA, but with some differences. In LIDA, the codelets assumed to
be in a coalition are those which trigger at the same time. This is not the same in CST.
In CST, codelets are assumed to be in a coalition just if they are coupled together by
means of a common memory object. CST implementation of GWT also allows for subtle
variations or interpretations of GTW, something which is not available in LIDA.
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Imagination and Planning Codelets
Computational Imagination (Setchi et al., 2007) is also a cognitive function described
in many works (Chella et al., 2005; Marques & Holland, 2009). In some sense, imagina-
tion and planning are bounded together. Imagination and Planning Codelets are codelets
which implement different techniques for planning and imagination in a cognitive archi-
tecture. Alternatively, it is possible to bind standard approaches to planning, as in Prolog,
or SOAR, together with other techniques using CST. In fact, any kind of rule-based sys-
tem available in Java can be linked to CST and be a part of a cognitive architecture
constructed with the aid of the toolkit.
Behavioral Codelets
Planning codelets might make use of different behaviors, implemented through Be-
havioral Codelets. Alternatively, Behavioral Codelets can be used to implement different
kinds of action selection mechanisms. Currently, CST provides support for implementing
a behavior system like in the Subsumption Architecture (Brooks, 1986, 1991) or using
Maes (1989) Behavioral Networks (Tyrrell, 1994).
Motor Codelets
Motor codelets are responsible for picking up Memory Objects from the Motor Memory
and transforming them into actuations at the environment. This can be done by simply
capturing actuator values and feeding actuators, or by some special protocol interacting
with external software or hardware. Usually, these Motor Memory Objects are generated
by earlier Behavioral Codelets.
Other Codelets
Other cognitive functions are planned to be implemented in CST. Among others,
we intend to extend CST by constructing codelets for implementing meta-cognitive sub-
systems (Cox, 2005; Sun et al., 2006; Sloman, 2011), theory-of-mind (Sodian & Kristen,
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2010), motivational systems (Sun & Wilson, 2011), social cognition (Greenwald & Banaji,
1995; Gallese et al., 2004) and possibly others.
At the time of this publication, the CST had been released as an open source software
on Github for only 6 months, and the following kinds of codelets were available, considering
the classification in Figure 4.4:
1. Sensory Codelets: sensors are usually very specific and will probably have to be
implemented in every application.
(a) Sensor codelet based on Baars & Gage (2007) concept of Working Memory.
2. Perceptual Codelets
(a) Perception codelet based on Baars & Gage (2007) concept of Working Memory.
3. Attention Codelets: no types available yet at the toolbox.
4. Emotional Codelets: no types available yet at the toolbox.
5. Learning Codelets
(a) Learning codelet based on GLAS algorithm, designed and implemented in
Raizer (2015) work.
6. Language Codelets: no types available yet at the toolbox.
7. Consciousness Codelets
(a) Consciousness codelet based on Baars et al. (2013) concept of the Dynamic
Global Workspace Theory, designed and implemented in this work.
8. Imagination and Planning Codelets: no types available yet at the toolbox.
9. Behavioral Codelets
(a) Behaviour Network codelet, based on Maes (1989) work.
(b) Subsumption architecture codelet, based on Brooks (1991) work.
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10. Motor Codelets: Just like sensors, motor codelets are very specific of each applica-
tion, and will likely have to be implemented for every application.
(a) Motor codelet based on Baars & Gage (2007) concept of Working Memory.
Even though there are still some kinds of codelets which, despite specified, are not
yet available at the toolbox, those available are enough to develop a working cognitive
architecture able to control an artificial agent. This work contributed with the design and
implementation of a particular consciousness codelet, the so called Spotlight Broadcast
Controller Codelet, based on Baars et al. (2013) concept of the Dynamic Global Workspace
Theory. A developer requiring this capability, only has to instantiate this codelet as an
object inside coderack and the Global Workspace Algorithm (described in section 3.3) will
be executed. Considering the activation calculated in the method calculateActivation() of
each codelet, and the output of the winner codelet, the conscious one, will be broadcasted
and available at the B input of every codelet in the Coderack. Below, we show the final
version, by the time of this publication, of the consciousness codelet produced. The whole
Java implementation of the CST is available at https://github.com/CST-Group/cst.
/*******************************************************************************
* Copyright (c) 2012 DCA-FEEC-UNICAMP
* All rights reserved. This program and the accompanying materials
* are made available under the terms of the GNU Lesser Public License v3
* which accompanies this distribution, and is available at
* http://www.gnu.org/licenses/lgpl.html
*
* Contributors:
* K. Raizer, A. L. O. Paraense, R. R. Gudwin - initial API and implementation
******************************************************************************/
package br.unicamp.cst.consciousness;
import java.util.ArrayList;
import java.util.List;
import br.unicamp.cst.core.entities.CodeRack;
import br.unicamp.cst.core.entities.Codelet;
import br.unicamp.cst.core.entities.MemoryObject;
import br.unicamp.cst.core.exceptions.CodeletActivationBoundsException;
/**
* @author Andre Paraense
*
* A codelet-based implementation of the Global Workspace Theory, originally formulated
* in [1988 Baars] Bernard J. Baars. A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press, 1988.
*
*/
public class SpotlightBroadcastController extends Codelet
{
private Codelet consciousCodelet;
/** access to all codelets, so the broadcast can be made*/
private CodeRack codeRack;
private double thresholdActivation = 0.9d;
public SpotlightBroadcastController(CodeRack codeRack)
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{
this.setName("SpotlightBroadcastController");
this.codeRack = codeRack;
consciousCodelet = null;
this.timeStep = 300l;
}
/* (non-Javadoc)
* @see br.unicamp.cogsys.core.entities.Codelet#accessMemoryObjects()
*/
@Override
public void accessMemoryObjects()
{
// nothing
}
/* (non-Javadoc)
* @see br.unicamp.cogsys.core.entities.Codelet#calculateActivation()
*/
@Override
public void calculateActivation()
{
try
{
setActivation(0.0d);
} catch (CodeletActivationBoundsException e)
{
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
/* (non-Javadoc)
* @see br.unicamp.cogsys.core.entities.Codelet#proc()
*/
@Override
public void proc()
{
if(consciousCodelet!=null)
{
if(consciousCodelet.getActivation() < thresholdActivation)
{
consciousCodelet = null;
}
}
if(codeRack!=null)
{
//first, select the coalition with greater activation to gain consciousness
List<Codelet> allCodeletsList = codeRack.getAllCodelets();
if(allCodeletsList!=null)
{
for (Codelet codelet: allCodeletsList)
{
if(consciousCodelet == null)
{
if(codelet.getActivation() > thresholdActivation)
{
consciousCodelet = codelet;
}
}else
{
if(codelet.getActivation() > consciousCodelet.getActivation())
{
consciousCodelet = codelet;
}
}
}
//then, broadcast its information to all codelets
if(consciousCodelet!=null)
{
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List<MemoryObject> memoryObjectsToBeBroadcasted = consciousCodelet.getOutputs();
if(memoryObjectsToBeBroadcasted!=null)
{
for (Codelet codelet: allCodeletsList)
{
if(!codelet.getName().equalsIgnoreCase( consciousCodelet.getName() ))
codelet.setBroadcast(memoryObjectsToBeBroadcasted);
else
codelet.setBroadcast(new ArrayList<MemoryObject>());
}
}else
{
for (Codelet codelet: allCodeletsList)
{
codelet.setBroadcast(new ArrayList<MemoryObject>());
}
}
}else
{
for (Codelet codelet: allCodeletsList)
{
codelet.setBroadcast(new ArrayList<MemoryObject>());
}
}
}
}
}
}
In Chapter 5, we present how we designed and implemented the machine conscious-
ness urban traffic signal controller as a CST Architecture, using the new consciousness
capability we implemented and made available in the toolkit as a GWT Codelet called
Spotlight Broadcast Controller.
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Chapter 5
Materials and Methods
After presenting the theoretical background required to build the machine conscious-
ness urban traffic signal controller, as a CST Architecture, we now start describing our
experiments in terms of materials and methods. In the next Chapter, we present the
experiments results.
In section 5.1, we present the materials used in our experiments. In subsection 5.1.1,
we present the traffic simulator used to run our experiments. The simulator chosen is a
well known traffic simulator, widely used in the scientific community, called SUMO (Sim-
ulation of Urban Mobility). SUMO uses the microscopic approach to traffic simulation,
described in section 2.1.3. In subsection 5.1.2 we present the test bed used to run the
experiments, composed of five different urban network models. Closing the materials sec-
tion, in subsection 5.1.3, we present the CST Architecture we built, in order to control the
traffic signals in the different network models that compose our test bed. Using the CST,
we built two different traffic controllers, one which is an adaptive controller, considering
only local conditions around its junction, and the machine consciousness controller, which
considers not only the local conditions of its junction but also the global broadcasted in-
formation from the conscious junction. We also used a third controller, given by SUMO,
which uses a fixed time strategy.
In section 5.2, we present the methods used to test our hypothesis, that is, how we
planned the experiments ran with the materials we designed and implemented, in order
to validate our scientific hypothesis.
5.1. Materials 90
5.1 Materials
5.1.1 The SUMO Traffic Simulator
In this work, we used the SUMO (Simulation of Urban MObility) traffic simulator
(Krajzewicz et al., 2012), a computational environment using microscopic simulation of
vehicles in order to run our experiments. SUMO is a free and open traffic simulation suite
which is available since 2001. It allows modelling of intermodal traffic systems including
road vehicles, public transportation and pedestrians.
The SUMO simulation platform offers many features:
• Microscopic simulation - vehicles, pedestrians and public transportation are modeled
explicitly;
• Online interaction – control of the simulation items, including traffic signals, through
the TraCI interface. TraCI is the short term for “Traffic Control Interface”. Giving
the access to a running road traffic simulation, it allows to retrieve values of sim-
ulated objects and to manipulate their behaviour “on-line” in a SUMO instance.
TraCI uses a TCP based client/server architecture to provide access to SUMO.
Thereby, SUMO acts as server that is started with additional command-line op-
tions: –remote-port <INT> where <INT> is the port SUMO will listen on for
incoming connections. The simulation can be started, stopped and advanced step
by step. While the simulation is running, much information can be retrieved, both
static (e.g. the road network topology) and dynamic (e.g. position and speed of
vehicles);
• Time schedules of traffic lights can be imported or generated automatically by
SUMO;
• No artificial limitations in network size and number of simulated vehicles;
• Supported map import formats: OpenStreetMap, VISUM, VISSIM, NavTeq.
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In this work, we used the tool NETCONVERT, which is part of the SUMO package,
to import network models in the OpenStreetMaps format and online interaction through
the TraCI API to remotely control the time schedules of traffic lights during simulations.
An example of a linux command line to generate the network model file from the
OpenStreetMaps exported file is:
$ netconvert --osm-files downtownCampinas.osm.xml -o downtownCampinas.net.xml --tls.join --ramps.guess --ignore-errors --no-turnarounds
where:
• downtownCampinas.osm.xml - the OpenStreetMaps exported map file
• downtownCampinas.net.xml - the network model file to be generated
In order to generate vehicle routes, we used two other auxiliary tools, also part of the
SUMO package. The first one is the randomTrips.py, a python program which takes the
network model as an input and generates random trips for each vehicle. The second one
is the duarouter, which takes both the network, generated by NETCONVERT, and the
random trips, generated by duarouter as inputs, and generates all the routes for all the
vehicles. In section 5.2, we explain in more details the variables involved in these routes
generation, such as time window and density of vehicles in different scenarios.
An example of linux command lines to generate the routes is:
$ python randomTrips.py -n manhattan.net.xml -e 5400 -l -L -p 0.1 -s 1000 --fringe-factor 10 -o manhattan.p0.1.1.trips.xml
$ duarouter -n manhattan.net.xml -t manhattan.p0.1.1.trips.xml -o manhattan.p0.1.1.rou.xml --ignore-errors --random
where:
• manhattan.net.xml - the network model
• 5400 - time window for generating the trips in seconds
• 1000 - the seed for the random generator
• manhattan.p0.1.1.trips.xml - the trips file to be generated
• manhattan.p0.1.1.rou.xml - the routes file to be generated
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Finally, SUMO runs taking as inputs the network model, generated by NETCON-
VERT, and the routes, generated by duarouter. With an option set, the simulator will
write to a file a summary output, containing all the information it generates in each step,
such as mean travel time, cars ended and mean waiting time. An example of a linux
command line to run a simulation would be:
$ sumo -n manhattan.net.xml -r manhattan.p0.1.1.rou.xml --summary-output output.sumo.manhattan.p0.1.1.consc.xml --remote-port 9000
where:
• manhattan.net.xml - the network model
• manhattan.p0.1.1.rou.xml - the vehicle routes file
• output.sumo.manhattan.p0.1.1.consc.xml - the summary output file to be produced
• 9000 - the port to which the simulator will listen for the TraCI interactions
The simulator will append to the output file in batches, usually at each 50 steps of
the simulation. At the end of the simulation, it is possible to use the auxiliary program
plot_summary.py to plot graphs of any of the measurements present in the output sum-
mary file over time. For instance, if we want to plot the graph of the mean travel time of
the vehicles over time, we could do so by running a linux command such as:
$ python plot_summary.py -i output.sumo.manhattan.p0.1.1.consc.xml --labels "Machine Consciousness" -o
output.sumo.manhattan.p0.1.1.consc.xml.pdf -m meanTravelTime --xlim 0,57600 --ylim 0,10000 --yticks 0,10001,2000,14 --xticks
0,57601,14400,14 --xtime1 --ygrid --ylabel "Mean Travel Time (s)" --xlabel "time (h)" --adjust .14,.1
where:
• output.sumo.manhattan.p0.1.1.consc.xml - the summary output file produced
• MachineConsciousness - the curve label
• output.sumo.manhattan.p0.1.1.consc.xml.pdf - the plot figure to be generated as a
PDF file
• meanTravelT ime - the measurement present in the output file to be plotted
• 0, 57600 - the x-axis limits
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Figure 5.1: Network model “Simple T”, where the experiments took place.
• 0, 10000 - the y-axis limits
• 0, 57601, 14400, 14 - the x-axis ticks
• 0, 10001, 2000, 14 - the y-axis ticks
• MeanTravelT ime(s) - the y-axis title
• time(h) - the x-axis title
Indeed, we have used the auxiliary program plot_summary.py to plot the graphs later
presented in Chapter 6 as the experiments results.
5.1.2 Network Models - Test Bed
Five network models were tested in this work.
The first one is called “Simple T”, which is composed by a single junction linking three
main roads, as shown in Figure 5.1.
The second one is called “Twin T”, that stands for the two junctions linking four main
roads, as shown in Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.2: Network model “Twin T”, where the experiments took place.
Figure 5.3: Network model “Corridor”, where the experiments took place.
The third model, called “Corridor”, is a little more complex than the “Twin T”, being
composed by four junctions connecting many roads, as shown in Figure 5.3.
The fourth model is even more complex, called “Manhattan”, a grid composed by 9
junctions, as shown in Figure 5.4.
The fifth model, called “Downtown Campinas”, is the most complex and the only real
network model, representing one whole region of the city of Campinas. This network is
composed by 109 junctions, as shown in Figure 5.5.
5.1.3 Our CST Architecture - The Traffic Controllers
We tested three different traffic controllers in our experiments.
The first one, called “Fixed Times”, is the simplest and most common traffic controller.
It has a fixed traffic signal plan, independently from the traffic in its controlled lanes,
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Figure 5.4: Network model “Manhattan”, where the experiments took place.
changing the traffic lights in regular fixed periods called “phases”. As this one is a trivial
traffic controller, we did not have to design and implement it, we just used the one
provided by SUMO. In this case, the traffic light plans are generated in the absence of
any traffic demand information. Hence, no optimizations are undertaken1. The idea is
just to have the results of this controller to be used as a baseline or reference.
The second and third ones, called “Parallel Reactive” and “Machine Consciousness”,
respectively, were designed and implemented using CST. Both of them rely in sensory
information, from vehicles traveling in the crossing lanes, in order to choose one phase
among n possible phases, with red and green lights for each lane in the junction. These
1There was no documentation of SUMO’s heuristic to generate this fixed times plan by the time
of this publication, only the code could be found at https://svn.code.sf.net/p/sumo/code/trunk/
sumo/src/netbuild/NBOwnTLDef.cpp.
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Figure 5.5: Network model “Downtown Campinas”, where the experiments took place.
are the two controllers we want to compare, in order to study the influence of the machine
consciousness mechanism.
In order to explain the modeling of the traffic controllers we implemented, we use the
simplified network model of Figure 5.6, which is a zoom of the first two junctions from
left to right in Figure 5.3, and then explain how this modeling extends to any situation.
In Figure 5.6, we detail the many sensed regions, represented by letters (a) to (k), and
the different possible phases, drawn on top right, which can be chosen by the controller
in these junctions.
The controllers built with CST can be modeled for this simplified situation as shown
in Figure 5.7.
There are four types of codelets in our model:
• Sensory Codelets: for each set of inductive sensors in the region in front of the
traffic light, there is one codelet whose output is the pair of vectors X, holding the
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Figure 5.6: Network model of the sensed regions in front of the traffic lights, represented by
letters (a) to (k), and the different possibles phases which can be chosen by the controller,
drawn on top right, considering junction West and junction East.
position of all vehicles in that region, and V , holding the velocities of each one of
the vehicles.
• Behavioral Codelets: for each junction there is one codelet whose inputs are positions
and velocities for the vehicles in front of the traffic lights (plus the broadcast from
consciousness), and output is one of the traffic lights possible phases for the junction.
• Consciousness Codelet: responsible for selecting the sensory content to gain con-
sciousness and for the broadcast of conscious content among all codelets.
• Motor codelets: for each junction, there is one codelet whose input is a chosen phase
for the junction traffic lights and the codelet is responsible for implementing that
phase in the real system.
The “Parallel Reactive” controller is automatic or “unconscious”, in our analogy to
the animal brain. Each sensory codelet captures the vehicles position and velocity in its
respective lane continuously, while one behavioral codelet for each junction performs the
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Figure 5.7: Model of the controllers built on top of CST for the simplified Figure 5.6
network model. Four types of codelets were used. Three types were implemented for this
specific application - a sensory codelet, a behavioral codelet and a motor codelet. Also,
the consciousness codelet provided by CST (also a contribution of this work) was used
in the model. In the example shown above, junction East is chosen by the consciousness
codelet to gain the spotlight. The consciousness codelet does not change the information
of the memory object of the junction East in the motor memory, but just highlights it
as the conscious content. The output of the behavioral codelet junction East is then
broadcasted to the global input B of the behavioral codelet junction West.
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following algorithm, later formally expressed in Algorithm 1:
1. Calculates its level of activation, which is given by equation 5.1, taken from Box &
Waterson (2013) work.
a(t) =
∑
c∈C
(1− αVc(t)− βXc(t))
|C| (5.1)
2. Determines the best phase among the possible ones based on a simple calculation
as shown in Table 5.1.
3. Goes back to 1.
In equation 5.1, C is the set of all vehicles monitored by the inductive sensors in one
junction; Vc is the vehicle’s velocity andXc is the vehicle’s distance to the junction; α and β
are constants that can be tuned to adjust the influence in the junction’s codelet activation,
based on the number of vehicles, velocities and distances from the given junction. The
closer to the junction and the slower the vehicles, the greater the codelet’s activation
representing the junction. According to Box & Waterson (2013), α = 0.01sm−1 and
β = 0.001m−1 are values which result in a balance between these influences close to real
data, and were, therefore, used in this work.
Finally, based on the chosen phase for each junction, the respective motor codelet
modifies the junction traffic lights and the cycle is repeated. In the “Parallel Reactive”
case, there is no Consciousness Codelet, and each junction codelet decides its phase based
solely on the information they receive from their respective sensory codelets.
In the case of the “Machine Consciousness” Controller, the only difference is the pres-
ence of the Consciousness codelet, which does the following, later expressed in Algorithm
2:
1. Defines the junction codelet with greater activation level, which gains access to
conscious global workspace while respecting a minimum threshold. If none of the
codelets reaches the threshold, the system works unconsciously and global workspace
remains empty.
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Algorithm 1 Parallel Reactive behavioral codelet
1: procedure activation(lane)
2: alpha← 0.01
3: beta← 0.001
4: vehicleNumber ← lane.getV ehicleNumber()
5: laneActivation← 0
6: if vehicleNumber > 0 then
7: for i = 0; i < vehicleNumber do
8: at← 1− alpha ∗ lane.V [i]− beta ∗ lane.X[i] . X - array distances
9: laneActivation← laneActivation+ at . V - array velocities
10: i← i+ 1
11: return laneActivation
12: procedure findBestPhase(possiblePhases, controlledIncomingLanes)
13: bestPhase← −1
14: bestPhaseV alue← Integer.MIN_V ALUE
15: for i = 0; i < possiblePhases.size() do
16: p← possiblePhases[i]
17: phaseV alue← 0
18: for j = 0; j < p.lightStates.size() do
19: ls← p.lightStates[j]
20: if ls = GREEN then
21: cil← controlledIncomingLanes[j]
22: phaseV alue← phaseV alue+ activation(cil)
23: j ← j + 1
24: if phaseV alue > bestPhaseV alue then
25: bestPhaseV alue← phaseV alue
26: bestPhase← bestPhase
27: i← i+ 1
28: return bestPhase
Table 5.1: Action selection in the Junction East codelet. In this example, phase number
3 was selected because it gives the best sum of green lanes activations.
1. Heuristic activation for each
lane
2. Overall Junction
East activation
3. Determination of the
best phase - sum of ac-
tivations of green traffic
lights
AT (l) =
∑
c∈C
(1− αVc(t)− βXc(t))
(5.2)
ATJ(j) =
∑
i=1→n
AT (i)
n
(5.3)
Pa =
∑
tl∈G
AT (tl) (5.4)
AT(g) = 0.09
AT(h) = 0.3
AT(i) = 0.85
AT(j) = 0.05
AT(k) = 0.13
ATJe = 0.858 P1(G,G,R,G,G) = 0.57
P2(G,R,G,R,R) = 0.94
P3(R,R,G,R,G) = 0.98
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2. Broadcasts the sensory information of the conscious codelet.
3. Goes back to 1.
Algorithm 2 Machine Consciousness codelet
1: procedure proc(consciousCodelet, allCodeletsList)
2: thresholdActivation← 0.9
3: if consciousCodelet then
4: if consciousCodelet.getActivation() < thresholdActivation then
5: consciousCodelet← NULL
6: for i = 0; i < allCodeletsList.size() do
7: codelet← allCodeletsList[i]
8: if consciousCodelet == NULL then
9: if codelet.getActivation() > thresholdActivation then
10: consciousCodelet← codelet
11: Else
12: if codelet.getActivation() > consciousCodelet.getActivation() then
13: consciousCodelet← codelet
14: i← i+ 1
15: if consciousCodelet 6= NULL then
16: for j = 0; j < allCodeletsList.size() do
17: codelet← allCodeletsList[j]
18: codelet.Broadcast← consciousCodelet.getOutputs()
19: j ← j + 1
Broadcast information contains details about how critical the situation is in the worst
junction in the network controlled lanes. Other junctions receiving the broadcast will
decide whether or not to use this information to choose its next phase based on the
network topology by following two simple rules, later expressed in Algorithm 3:
1. If one incoming lane of my junction is topologically connected to one incoming lane2
of the conscious junction that has a red light in its chosen phase, I must close it
with a red light.
2. If one incoming lane of my junction is topologically connected to one incoming lane
of the conscious junction that has a green light in its chosen phase, or if it is not
connected at all, I must open it with a green light.
2It is one incoming lane of the first junction topologically connected to another incoming lane of the
second junction considering that the path will go through the first junction.
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 5.8: Conscious broadcast and interference mechanism. Panel 5.8a shows the par-
allel controllers acting. In panel 5.8b, the consciousness codelet finds the most critical
junction and broadcast the information of its output memory objects (that is, the chosen
phase) to all other junctions. Panel 5.8c illustrates an example of which junctions might
decide to cooperate with the most critical junction in order to solve the problem it is
facing.
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Algorithm 3 Broadcast interference rules
1: procedure broadcastInterf(controlledLanes, consciousControlledLanes )
2: for i = 0; i < controlledLanes.size() do
3: cl← controlledLanes[i]
4: if isConnected(cl, consciousControlledLanes) then
5: if consciousControlledLanes[i].TLS == RED then
6: cl.TLS ← RED . TLS - Traffic Light State
7: Else
8: cl.TLS ← GREEN
9: Else
10: cl.TLS ← GREEN
11: i← i+ 1
The hypothesis is that these two simple rules should generate a behaviour similar to
dynamic green waves in the network whenever there is a critical situation, helping to solve
the conflict as soon as possible, alleviating the situation until the flow becomes normal
again.
For the sake of clarity, the example given in this section modeled only two of the
four junctions in Figure 5.3. Nevertheless, the controller has the ability to model any
urban network given in a digital format that can be read by SUMO, such as the Open
Street Maps “.OSM” format (Haklay & Weber, 2008), for instance. In order to do so,
in the beginning of the simulation, the controller reads the network model and creates
the corresponding codelets: one behavioral codelet for each junction in the model, one
motor codelet for each junction, one sensory codelet for each lane controlled by each
junction and one singleton consciousness codelet. These codelets are also attached to
their corresponding memory objects, following the same architecture principles as the
ones given in this section example: outputs of sensory codelets are attached as inputs
to behavioral codelets, whose outputs are attached as inputs to motor codelets and the
broadcast of the consciousness codelet is attached as an input to the behavioral codelets.
The behavioral codelets keep a memory of the topology of the network model surrounding
them (not represented in Figure 5.7), within a predefined radius (in this work we used
1 km), so they can answer whether they are connected or not to the conscious junction,
which is important in order to interpret the broadcast information and decide whether
or not to act upon it, just like Baars’ theater audience decide if they want to interact in
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the play going on the stage, based on the information broadcasted and in their internal
values.
Once again, in order to dig deeper in the details, we invite you to visit our Java
implementation of the CST Architecture described, made available as open source software
at https://github.com/CST-Group/traffic-signal-control-app. Figure 5.9 shows
an UML representation of the three codelets specifically implemented for this application.
In order to represent how a codelet is implemented, we show the code of the simplest
one of these three codelets, the motor codelet, below. The whole Java implementation of
the Machine Consciousness CST Architecture built to control the traffic signals is available
at https://github.com/CST-Group/traffic-signal-control-app.
/*******************************************************************************
* Copyright (c) 2016 DCA-FEEC-UNICAMP
* All rights reserved. This program and the accompanying materials
* are made available under the terms of the Apache License, Version 2.0
* which accompanies this distribution, and is available at
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Contributors:
* A. L. O. Paraense, R. R. Gudwin - initial implementation
******************************************************************************/
package br.unicamp.cst.trafficUnjammer.codeRack.motorCodelets;
import it.polito.appeal.traci.ChangeLightsStateQuery;
import it.polito.appeal.traci.TLState;
import it.polito.appeal.traci.TrafficLight;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.util.List;
import br.unicamp.cst.core.entities.Codelet;
import br.unicamp.cst.core.entities.MemoryObject;
import br.unicamp.cst.core.exceptions.CodeletActivationBoundsException;
import br.unicamp.cst.trafficUnjammer.rawMemory.MemoryObjectTypesTrafficLightController;
/**
* @author andre
*
*/
public class TrafficLightActuator extends Codelet
{
private TrafficLight trafficLight;
private List<TLState> trafficLightPhases;
private MemoryObject phaseMO;
private MemoryObject forcedPhaseMO;
public TrafficLightActuator(TrafficLight trafficLight, List<TLState> TLStates)
{
this.trafficLight = trafficLight;
this.trafficLightPhases = TLStates;
}
/* (non-Javadoc)
* @see br.unicamp.cogsys.core.entities.Codelet#accessMemoryObjects()
*/
@Override
public void accessMemoryObjects()
{
int index=0;
if(phaseMO==null)
phaseMO = this.getInput( MemoryObjectTypesTrafficLightController.PHASE, index);
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Figure 5.9: Our Java implementation of the codelets implemented in the Machine Con-
sciousness CST Architecture built to control the traffic signals.
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if(forcedPhaseMO==null)
forcedPhaseMO = this.getInput( MemoryObjectTypesTrafficLightController.FORCED_PHASE, index);
}
/* (non-Javadoc)
* @see br.unicamp.cogsys.core.entities.Codelet#calculateActivation()
*/
@Override
public void calculateActivation()
{
try
{
setActivation(0.0d);
} catch (CodeletActivationBoundsException e)
{
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
/* (non-Javadoc)
* @see br.unicamp.cogsys.core.entities.Codelet#proc()
*/
@Override
public void proc()
{
if(forcedPhaseMO!=null && forcedPhaseMO.getI()!=null && !( (String) forcedPhaseMO.getI()).equalsIgnoreCase("-1"))
{
try
{
TLState forcedPhase = new TLState((String) forcedPhaseMO.getI());
ChangeLightsStateQuery lstQ = trafficLight.queryChangeLightsState();
lstQ.setValue(forcedPhase);
try
{
lstQ.run();
} catch (IOException e)
{
e.printStackTrace();
}
}catch(Exception e)
{
e.printStackTrace();
}
}else
{
int phaseIndex = -1;
if(phaseMO.getI()!=null)
{
try
{
phaseIndex = Integer.valueOf((String) phaseMO.getI());
}catch(Exception e)
{
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
if(phaseIndex >= 0 && trafficLight != null && trafficLightPhases != null && trafficLightPhases.size() > phaseIndex)
{
ChangeLightsStateQuery lstQ = trafficLight.queryChangeLightsState();
lstQ.setValue(trafficLightPhases.get(phaseIndex));
try
{
lstQ.run();
} catch (IOException e)
{
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
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}
}
}
5.2 Methods
5.2.1 Simulation Scenarios
For each one of the five network models, four simulated scenarios were considered.
The first scenario, called “P = 0.1”, generates vehicles with random routes in a 0.1 second
period during a time window of 5,400 seconds, generating a very high concentration of
vehicles coming from different sources of the network model and flowing to different edges.
The edges probability of being assigned as the destination of one vehicle trip is weighted
by length and number of lanes, so that larger avenues get more cars. The random routes
generated are not related or representative of real traffic in principle. The objective of
the experiments is to generate different traffic loads and critical traffic situations, so the
machine consciousness mechanism can be observed in action. The second scenario, called
“P = 0.4” has the same attributes of the first one except for the vehicle generation period,
which is 0.4 second, generating a lower traffic outcome. The same method is applied for
“P = 0.7” and “P = 1.0”. This gives a combination of 20 experimental scenarios, which
were run 10 times each, summing up a total of 200 experiments. In each one of these
experiments, the simulation was run for each one of three different controllers. Each car is
assigned to a random predefined route, containing all the steps it will take from its source,
which can be anywhere in the network, to its destination, which can also be anywhere in
the network.
Each simulated experiment is run for as long as necessary, until all vehicles generated
during the first 5,400 seconds reach their final destination. During the simulation, the
mean travel time and the end of the trip of all vehicles are measured and later plotted
over time to compare the performance of the three controllers.
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5.2.2 Controlled Experiments
The choice of five network models and four concentration scenarios of simulation was
intended to provide control groups for the algorithms and controllers being tested, consid-
ering the scientific hypothesis we want to validate. For instance, in the case of the Simple
T model, as there is only one junction, there is no use for the conscious broadcast, since
there are no other junctions to receive it. Hence, it is expected that both controllers, par-
allel reactive and machine conscious ones, would behave in the same way. In this sense,
“Simple T” represents a control group. The same analogy can be applied to scenarios
where “P = 1.0” in the network models because, with lower traffic, codelets’ activations
will rarely reach the conscious threshold, and the parallel reactive and machine conscious-
ness controllers should have similar performances, also representing some sort of control
group to evaluate the algorithms’ outputs.
In Chapter 6, we will present the results we reached for the aforementioned experiments
and our interpretation of the validation of our initial hypothesis.
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Chapter 6
Results
After presenting the materials and methods we used to test and validate our scientific
hypothesis, it is now time to present the results of our controlled experiments and our
interpretation of them. Since we stated our scientific hypothesis back on Chapter 1, it is
now appropriate to reinforce our memory of it, before seeing and analyzing the results:
“The scientific hypothesis of this work is that an artificial mechanism, in-
spired on some properties and models of consciousness, can bring advantages
to automatic processes, such as urban traffic lights control.”
The Chapter is organized as follows: the first five sections are dedicated to presenting
and analyzing the results of each one of the network models, considering all scenarios and
traffic controllers, as explained in section 5.2 - Simple T model in section 6.1, Twin T
model in section 6.2, Corridor model in section 6.3, Manhattan model in section 6.4 and
Downtown Campinas model in section 6.5. We close the Chapter in section 6.6 explaining
how to access the raw data results of the experiments.
6.1 Simple T Model
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show the results of four simulation experiments considering sce-
nario P = 0.1, presenting mean travel time and end of the trip of all vehicles over time,
respectively.
Figures 6.3 and 6.4 show the results of four simulation experiments considering sce-
nario P = 0.4, presenting mean travel time and end of the trip of all vehicles over time,
respectively.
Figures 6.5 and 6.6 show the results of four simulation experiments considering sce-
nario P = 0.7, presenting mean travel time and end of the trip of all vehicles over time,
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Figure 6.1: Simple T Model in scenario P = 0.1. Mean travel time is given in seconds
in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal axis. Panels
6.1a, 6.1b, 6.1c and 6.1d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
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Figure 6.2: Simple T Model in scenario P = 0.1. Cars ending the trip is given in units
in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal axis. Panels
6.2a, 6.2b, 6.2c and 6.2d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
6.1. Simple T Model 112
00:00 01:00 02:00 03:00 04:00
time (h)
0
50
100
150
200
M
ea
n 
Tr
av
el
 T
im
e 
(s
)
Fixed Times
Parallel Reactive
Machine Consciousness
(a)
00:00 01:00 02:00 03:00 04:00
time (h)
0
50
100
150
200
M
ea
n 
Tr
av
el
 T
im
e 
(s
)
Fixed Times
Parallel Reactive
Machine Consciousness
(b)
00:00 01:00 02:00 03:00 04:00
time (h)
0
50
100
150
200
M
ea
n 
Tr
av
el
 T
im
e 
(s
)
Fixed Times
Parallel Reactive
Machine Consciousness
(c)
00:00 01:00 02:00 03:00 04:00
time (h)
0
50
100
150
200
M
ea
n 
Tr
av
el
 T
im
e 
(s
)
Fixed Times
Parallel Reactive
Machine Consciousness
(d)
Figure 6.3: Simple T Model in scenario P = 0.4. Mean travel time is given in seconds
in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal axis. Panels
6.3a, 6.3b, 6.3c and 6.3d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
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Figure 6.4: Simple T Model in scenario P = 0.4. Cars ending the trip is given in units
in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal axis. Panels
6.4a, 6.4b, 6.4c and 6.4d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
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Figure 6.5: Simple T Model in scenario P = 0.7. Mean travel time is given in seconds
in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal axis. Panels
6.5a, 6.5b, 6.5c and 6.5d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
respectively.
Figures 6.7 and 6.8 show the results of four simulation experiments considering sce-
nario P = 1.0, presenting mean travel time and end of the trip of all vehicles over time,
respectively.
In the Simple T model experiments, we found the same results for the Machine Con-
sciousness and Parallel Reactive controllers, which were always better than the Fixed
Times controller. This is in line with our predictions and expectations, because as the
Simple T model has only one junction, there is no use for the GWT broadcast, since there
is no other junction to receive the information of the most critical junction and take ad-
vantage of it. This model is therefore a control group for our experiments and the results
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Figure 6.6: Simple T Model in scenario P = 0.7. Cars ending the trip is given in units
in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal axis. Panels
6.6a, 6.6b, 6.6c and 6.6d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
6.1. Simple T Model 116
00:00 00:30 01:00 01:30 02:00
time (h)
0
20
40
60
80
100
M
ea
n 
Tr
av
el
 T
im
e 
(s
)
Fixed Times
Parallel Reactive
Machine Consciousness
(a)
00:00 00:30 01:00 01:30 02:00
time (h)
0
20
40
60
80
100
M
ea
n 
Tr
av
el
 T
im
e 
(s
)
Fixed Times
Parallel Reactive
Machine Consciousness
(b)
00:00 00:30 01:00 01:30 02:00
time (h)
0
20
40
60
80
100
M
ea
n 
Tr
av
el
 T
im
e 
(s
)
Fixed Times
Parallel Reactive
Machine Consciousness
(c)
00:00 00:30 01:00 01:30 02:00
time (h)
0
20
40
60
80
100
M
ea
n 
Tr
av
el
 T
im
e 
(s
)
Fixed Times
Parallel Reactive
Machine Consciousness
(d)
Figure 6.7: Simple T Model in scenario P = 1.0. Mean travel time is given in seconds
in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal axis. Panels
6.7a, 6.7b, 6.7c and 6.7d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
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Figure 6.8: Simple T Model in scenario P = 1.0. Cars ending the trip is given in units
in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal axis. Panels
6.8a, 6.8b, 6.8c and 6.8d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
6.2. Twin T Model 118
were consistent with this proposition. In the P=0.1 scenario, the most crowded, we found
gains of around 35% in the vehicle’s mean travel time, while in the P=1.0 scenario, the
least crowded, we found gains of around 25%.
6.2 Twin T Model
Figures 6.9 and 6.10 show the results of four simulation experiments considering sce-
nario P = 0.1, presenting mean travel time and end of the trip of all vehicles over time,
respectively. Figures 6.9 and 6.10 represent one of the most interesting results of our
experiments. The network model now has two junctions, configuring a system which can
take advantage of the machine consciousness mechanism. In the most crowded scenario, P
= 0.1, we observe a very interesting output - the Parallel Reactive controller performance
is worse than the Fixed Times during most of the time, although ending better. This is
actually one of the few scenarios where we observe this kind of output. The explanation
for this is the fact that we observe two very close junctions, as can be seen in Figure 5.2,
a situation that makes them highly coupled, suffering with a heavy load of traffic, and
making decision by themselves, ignoring each other’s output, even though their decisions
highly affect the inputs of the other. Because the consciousness spotlight mechanism
chooses the junction in the worst condition and broadcast this information to the other
one, which in turn adapts to help the worst one, we do not find the same bad results in
the Machine Consciousness controller, which performs better always. We found gains in
the vehicle’s mean travel time of around 22%, compared to the Fixed Times, and around
13%, compared to the Parallel Reactive.
Figures 6.11 and 6.12 show the results of four simulation experiments considering
scenario P = 0.4, presenting mean travel time and end of the trip of all vehicles over
time, respectively. In this scenario, as the traffic load is reduced, we do not observe
the same poor performance of the Parallel Reactive controller, as we did in the P=0.1
scenario, but in some occasions its performance gets closer to the Fixed Times, and is
always worse than the Machine Consciousness controller. It is important to remember
that the Parallel Reactive controller runs the same CST Architecture of the Machine
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Figure 6.9: Twin T Model in scenario P = 0.1. Mean travel time is given in seconds in
the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal axis. Panels 6.9a,
6.9b, 6.9c and 6.9d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
6.2. Twin T Model 120
00:00 02:00 04:00 06:00 08:00 10:00 12:00
time (h)
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
ca
rs
 e
nd
ed
Fixed Times
Parallel Reactive
Machine Consciousness
(a)
00:00 02:00 04:00 06:00 08:00 10:00 12:00
time (h)
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
ca
rs
 e
nd
ed
Fixed Times
Parallel Reactive
Machine Consciousness
(b)
00:00 02:00 04:00 06:00 08:00 10:00 12:00
time (h)
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
ca
rs
 e
nd
ed
Fixed Times
Parallel Reactive
Machine Consciousness
(c)
00:00 02:00 04:00 06:00 08:00 10:00 12:00
time (h)
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
ca
rs
 e
nd
ed
Fixed Times
Parallel Reactive
Machine Consciousness
(d)
Figure 6.10: Twin T Model in scenario P = 0.1. Cars ending the trip is given in units
in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal axis. Panels
6.10a, 6.10b, 6.10c and 6.10d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
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Figure 6.11: Twin T Model in scenario P = 0.4. Mean travel time is given in seconds
in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal axis. Panels
6.11a, 6.11b, 6.11c and 6.11d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
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Figure 6.12: Twin T Model in scenario P = 0.4. Cars ending the trip is given in units
in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal axis. Panels
6.12a, 6.12b, 6.12c and 6.12d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
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Figure 6.13: Twin T Model in scenario P = 0.7. Mean travel time is given in seconds
in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal axis. Panels
6.13a, 6.13b, 6.13c and 6.13d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
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Figure 6.14: Twin T Model in scenario P = 0.7. Cars ending the trip is given in units
in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal axis. Panels
6.14a, 6.14b, 6.14c and 6.14d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
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Figure 6.15: Twin T Model in scenario P = 1.0. Mean travel time is given in seconds
in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal axis. Panels
6.15a, 6.15b, 6.15c and 6.15d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
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Figure 6.16: Twin T Model in scenario P = 1.0. Cars ending the trip is given in units
in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal axis. Panels
6.16a, 6.16b, 6.16c and 6.16d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
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Consciousness, including the same heuristic in the behavioral codelet, and their only
difference is the machine consciousness mechanism, as the consciousness codelet is active
in the CodeRack in the case of the Machine Consciousness controller, whether it is not
active in the case o f the Parallel Reactive controller. In this scenario, we found gains in
the vehicle’s mean travel time of around 35% comparing the Machine Consciousness to the
Fixed Times, and up to 26% in some simulations, comparing the Machine Consciousness
to the Parallel Reactive, but in the latter case most of the times the gains are around 15
%.
Figures 6.13 and 6.14 show the results of four simulation experiments considering
scenario P = 0.7, presenting mean travel time and end of the trip of all vehicles over
time, respectively. In this scenario, as the traffic load becomes already very small, there
is no difference in the performance of the Parallel Reactive controller and the Machine
Consciousness controller, mainly because there is no traffic jam problem. Both controllers
have very similar performances and the gains observed in vehicle’s mean travel time,
compared to the Fixed Times controller, are around more than 35%.
Figures 6.15 and 6.16 show the results of four simulation experiments considering
scenario P = 1.0, presenting mean travel time and end of the trip of all vehicles over time,
respectively. In this scenario, our interpretation is the same as in the P=0.7 scenario.
Both controllers have very similar performances and the gains observed in vehicle’s mean
travel time, compared to the Fixed Times controller, are around 30%.
6.3 Corridor Model
Figures 6.17 and 6.18 show the results of four simulation experiments considering
scenario P = 0.1, presenting mean travel time and end of the trip of all vehicles over
time, respectively. Corridor model is a little more sophisticated model, consisting of four
junctions, where expectations start to grow around how the machine consciousness will be
able to help in the overall performance of the system. Indeed, results were very consistent
in this model, presenting higher gains in the more crowded P = 1.0 scenario, and smaller
gains on the others, until almost no gain is seen on P=0.7 and P = 1.0. In the case of
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Figure 6.17: Corridor Model in scenario P = 0.1. Mean travel time is given in seconds
in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal axis. Panels
6.17a, 6.17b, 6.17c and 6.17d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
P=0.1, we observed gains of around 33%, comparing the Machine Consciousness controller
with the Fixed Times one, and 13% comparing with the Parallel Reactive controller.
Figures 6.19 and 6.20 show the results of four simulation experiments considering
scenario P = 0.4, presenting mean travel time and end of the trip of all vehicles over
time, respectively. In the case of P=0.4, we observed gains of around 30%, comparing the
Machine Consciousness controller with the Fixed Times one, and 10% comparing with
the Parallel Reactive controller.
Figures 6.21 and 6.22 show the results of four simulation experiments considering
scenario P = 0.7, presenting mean travel time and end of the trip of all vehicles over
time, respectively. In the case of P=0.7, we observed gains of around 80%, comparing the
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Figure 6.18: Corridor Model in scenario P = 0.1. Cars ending the trip is given in units
in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal axis. Panels
6.18a, 6.18b, 6.18c and 6.18d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
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Figure 6.19: Corridor Model in scenario P = 0.4. Mean travel time is given in seconds
in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal axis. Panels
6.19a, 6.19b, 6.19c and 6.19d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
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Figure 6.20: Corridor Model in scenario P = 0.4. Cars ending the trip is given in units
in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal axis. Panels
6.20a, 6.20b, 6.20c and 6.20d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
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Figure 6.21: Corridor Model in scenario P = 0.7. Mean travel time is given in seconds
in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal axis. Panels
6.21a, 6.21b, 6.21c and 6.21d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
Machine Consciousness controller with the Fixed Times one, and no gain comparing with
the Parallel Reactive controller. The reason is lack of traffic jam, as traffic load becomes
small.
Figures 6.23 and 6.24 show the results of four simulation experiments considering
scenario P = 1.0, presenting mean travel time and end of the trip of all vehicles over
time, respectively. In the case of P=1.0, we observed gains of around 40%, comparing the
Machine Consciousness controller with the Fixed Times one, and no gain comparing with
the Parallel Reactive controller. The reason is lack of traffic jam, as traffic load becomes
small.
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Figure 6.22: Corridor Model in scenario P = 0.7. Cars ending the trip is given in units
in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal axis. Panels
6.22a, 6.22b, 6.22c and 6.22d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
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Figure 6.23: Corridor Model in scenario P = 1.0. Mean travel time is given in seconds
in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal axis. Panels
6.23a, 6.23b, 6.23c and 6.23d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
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Figure 6.24: Corridor Model in scenario P = 1.0. Cars ending the trip is given in units
in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal axis. Panels
6.24a, 6.24b, 6.24c and 6.24d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
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Figure 6.25: Manhattan Model in scenario P = 0.1. Mean travel time is given in seconds
in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal axis. Panels
6.25a, 6.25b, 6.25c and 6.25d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
6.4 Manhattan Model
Figures 6.25 and 6.26 show the results of four simulation experiments considering
scenario P = 0.1, presenting mean travel time and end of the trip of all vehicles over time,
respectively. The Manhattan model inserts more challenge in the last step of network
models before experimenting our controllers in a real network. Once again, results were
consistent with our expectations in scenario P=0.1, where the Machine Consciousness
controller performed a little better than the Parallel Reactive. We found gains around
10% comparing the Machine Consciousness controller with the Parallel Reactive one and
around 45% comparing the Machine Consciousness controller to the Fixed Times. In the
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Figure 6.26: Manhattan Model in scenario P = 0.1. Cars ending the trip is given in units
in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal axis. Panels
6.26a, 6.26b, 6.26c and 6.26d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
Manhanttan Model results, the gap between end of the simulation of the Fixed Times
and the other controllers gets bigger. The reason is because the other controllers are more
efficient in alleviating the critical situation, and as the cars are generated only in the first
5400 seconds of the simulation and the left to complete their routes, the more efficient
the controller, the sooner its simulation will end in time.
Figures 6.27 and 6.28 show the results of four simulation experiments considering
scenario P = 0.4, presenting mean travel time and end of the trip of all vehicles over time,
respectively.
Figures 6.29 and 6.30 show the results of four simulation experiments considering
scenario P = 0.7, presenting mean travel time and end of the trip of all vehicles over time,
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Figure 6.27: Manhattan Model in scenario P = 0.4. Mean travel time is given in seconds
in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal axis. Panels
6.27a, 6.27b, 6.27c and 6.27d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
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Figure 6.28: Manhattan Model in scenario P = 0.4. Cars ending the trip is given in units
in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal axis. Panels
6.28a, 6.28b, 6.28c and 6.28d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
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Figure 6.29: Manhattan Model in scenario P = 0.7. Mean travel time is given in seconds
in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal axis. Panels
6.29a, 6.29b, 6.29c and 6.29d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
respectively.
Figures 6.31 and 6.32 show the results of four simulation experiments considering
scenario P = 1.0, presenting mean travel time and end of the trip of all vehicles over time,
respectively.
6.5 Downtown Campinas Model
Figures 6.33 and 6.34 show the results of simulation experiments considering scenario P
= 0.1, presenting mean travel time and end of the trip of all vehicles over time, respectively.
After having experimented with four smaller problems, Downtown Campinas is finally a
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Figure 6.30: Manhattan Model in scenario P = 0.7. Cars ending the trip is given in units
in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal axis. Panels
6.30a, 6.30b, 6.30c and 6.30d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
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Figure 6.31: Manhattan Model in scenario P = 1.0. Mean travel time is given in seconds
in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal axis. Panels
6.31a, 6.31b, 6.31c and 6.31d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
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Figure 6.32: Manhattan Model in scenario P = 1.0. Cars ending the trip is given in units
in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal axis. Panels
6.32a, 6.32b, 6.32c and 6.32d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
real model, composed by more than 100 junctions. In this model scenario P=0.1 became
so crowded with gridlock jams, that the Machine Consciousness and the Parallel Reactive
behaved almost the same all the time. This was because there was no much to do in the
gridlock situation. Even though the Machine Consciousness mechanism would identify
and broadcast the information about the most critical junction in the whole area, not
much could be done in order to help this junction. We found gains in the vehicle’s
mean travel time of around 3%, comparing the Machine Consciousness controller with
the Parallel Reactive one, and of around 30% comparing the Machine Consciousness to
the Fixed Times controller.
Figures 6.35 and 6.36 show the results of four simulation experiments considering
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Figure 6.33: Downtown Campinas Model in scenario P = 0.1. Mean travel time is given
in seconds in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal axis.
00:00 08:00 16:00 24:00 32:00 40:00
time (h)
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
ca
rs
 e
nd
ed
Fixed Times
Parallel Reactive
Machine Consciousness
(a)
Figure 6.34: Downtown Campinas Model in scenario P = 0.1. Cars ending the trip is
given in units in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal
axis.
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Figure 6.35: Downtown Campinas Model in scenario P = 0.4. Mean travel time is given
in seconds in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal
axis. Panels 6.35a, 6.35b, 6.35c and 6.35d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
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Figure 6.36: Downtown Campinas Model in scenario P = 0.4. Cars ending the trip is
given in units in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal
axis. Panels 6.36a, 6.36b, 6.36c and 6.36d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
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Figure 6.37: Downtown Campinas Model in scenario P = 0.7. Mean travel time is given
in seconds in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal
axis. Panels 6.37a, 6.37b, 6.37c and 6.37d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
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Figure 6.38: Downtown Campinas Model in scenario P = 0.7. Cars ending the trip is
given in units in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal
axis. Panels 6.38a, 6.38b, 6.38c and 6.38d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
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Figure 6.39: Downtown Campinas Model in scenario P = 1.0. Mean travel time is given
in seconds in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal
axis. Panels 6.39a, 6.39b, 6.39c and 6.39d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
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Figure 6.40: Downtown Campinas Model in scenario P = 1.0. Cars ending the trip is
given in units in the vertical axis, and simulation time is given in hours in the horizontal
axis. Panels 6.40a, 6.40b, 6.40c and 6.40d represent four distinct simulation experiments.
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scenario P = 0.4, presenting mean travel time and end of the trip of all vehicles over time,
respectively. As the gridlock situation became a little better in the P=0.4 scenario, gains
grew. Comparing the Machine Consciousness controller to the Parallel Reactive one, we
found gains in the vehicle’s mean travel time of around 25%, but reaching more than 40%
in some scenarios, while the comparison of the Machine Consciousness to the Fixed Times
showed gains of around 65%.
Figures 6.37 and 6.38 show the results of four simulation experiments considering
scenario P = 0.7, presenting mean travel time and end of the trip of all vehicles over
time, respectively. Even though the traffic load is reduced, the size of the model makes it
challenging anyway. In this case, we found the Parallel Reactive controller behaving badly
sometimes, getting closer in performance to the Fixed Times. The Machine Consciousness
controller performed always better. We found gains of around 20% comparing the Machine
Consciousness to the Parallel Reactive controller and of around 40% comparing to the
Fixed Times.
Figures 6.39 and 6.40 show the results of four simulation experiments considering
scenario P = 1.0, presenting mean travel time and end of the trip of all vehicles over
time, respectively. The Machine Consciousness controller performed always better. We
found gains of around 30% comparing the Machine Consciousness to the Parallel Reactive
controller and of around 50% comparing to the Fixed Times.
6.6 Experiments Raw Data
In this Chapter, we presented only four results for each scenario. Because the results
of the many experiments were coherent, this was a way of summing up and delivering the
message more directly. If you want to analyze more results or if you want to take a look
in more details, we have made the experiments raw data available at:
https://github.com/CST-Group/traffic-signal-control-app-experiments.
In this raw data repository, you will find the following structure and content:
1. /bin (runnable .jar of the CST Architecture)
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2. /experiments
(a) corridor
i. networkModel (urban network model structure)
ii. scripts (shell scripts used to run the experiments)
iii. summaryOutputs
A. fixed (results for the Fixed Times controller)
B. machineConsciousness (results for the Machine Consciousness controller)
C. parallelReactive (results for the Parallel Reactive controller)
iv. vehicleRoutesInputs (scenarios of the simulations - P=0.1,0.4,0.7 and 1.0)
(b) downtownCampinas (idem)
(c) manhattan (idem)
(d) simpleT (idem)
(e) twinT (idem)
The results achieved in this work showed the feasibility of the proposed system, and
brought evidence fulfilling the scientific hypothesis stated.
In Chapter 7, we close the thesis restating our main findings, their limitations and the
possibility of extending these findings in future works.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
7.1 Main Findings
A consistent gain in performance with the “Machine Consciousness” traffic signal
controller during all simulation time, throughout different simulated scenarios, could be
observed in the results of Chapter 6. By the end of the simulation, this gain can range
from around 10% to more than 20% in specific times of the simulated scenarios, when
compared to the “Parallel Reactive” controller without the artificial consciousness mech-
anism.. Due to the stochastic nature of simulated experiments, sometimes a smaller gain
in performance is observed, as in Figure 6.17c, which shows a gain around 7%, but even
in this case it is a relevant and consistent gain throughout the simulation.
As expected, there was no relevant difference in the behaviour of the “Parallel Reac-
tive” and the “Machine Consciousness” controllers, in the scenarios represented in Figure
6.1, 6.5 and 6.21, which is an evidence that the presence of the GWT mechanism not only
brings gains in performance in stress situations, but also does not interfere in situations
where the network is under a normal flow, resembling the way consciousness interferes in
the automatic unconscious processes in animal brain. In the cases of Figure 6.29a, 6.29b,
6.29c and 6.29d, due to the complexity of the network model, even the concentration P
= 0.7 was enough to produce lower stress situations. We also found out that the more
complex the model and the more critical the situation, the better was the gain produced
by the machine consciousness mechanism, until it reached a gridlock situation, and in
Figure 6.33, when the gains are highly reduced.
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7.2 Publications
This work has made contributions to the state of the art in cognitive architectures and
machine consciousness mechanisms. These contributions are documented in the present
text, and also in a number of international congress articles, journal papers, a submitted
patent and registered software, as follows:
1. Raizer, K., Paraense, A. L. O. and Gudwin, R. R. (2011). A cognitive neuroscience
inspired codelet-based cognitive architecture for the control of artificial creatures
with incremental levels of machine consciousness, Symposium Proceedings at the
AISB11 Convention. Machine Consciousness 2011: Self, Integration and Explana-
tion, UK Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Behaviour,
York, United Kingdom (Raizer et al., 2011).
2. Raizer, K., Paraense, A. L. O. and Gudwin, R. R. (2012). A cognitive architecture
with incremental levels of machine consciousness inspired by cognitive neuroscience,
International Journal of Machine Consciousness (Raizer et al., 2012).
3. Raizer, K., Rohmer, E., Paraense, A. L. O. and Gudwin, R. R (2013). Registered
Software: Intelligent Software Agent Applied to Assistive Technology (Raizer et al.,
2013a).
4. Raizer, K., Rohmer, E., Paraense, A. L. O., Gudwin, R. R. and Cardozo, E. (2013).
Pending patent: Method for the development of a suggestion agent with behavior
network for assistive technology (Raizer et al., 2013c).
5. Raizer, K., Rohmer, E., Paraense, A. L. O. and Gudwin, R. R. (2013). Effects
of behavior network as a suggestion system to assist BCI users, IEEE 2013 Sym-
posium on Computational Intelligence in Rehabilitation and Assistive Technologies
(CIRAT) (Raizer et al., 2013b).
6. Gudwin, R. R., Paraense, A. L. O., Raizer, K. (2015). A Cognitive Systems Toolkit
(CST), with machine consciousness capabilities, released as Open Source under
LGPL licence at https://github.com/CST-Group/cst (Gudwin et al., 2015).
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7. Paraense, A. L .O., Raizer, K. and Gudwin, R.R. (2015). A CST Machine Con-
sciousness Traffic Signal Control Application released as Open Source under Apache
licence at
https://github.com/CST-Group/traffic-signal-control-app (Paraense et al.,
2015).
8. Paraense, A. L. O., Raizer, K. and Gudwin, R.R. (2016). A machine consciousness
approach to urban traffic control, Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architectures, Vol-
ume 15, January 2016, Pages 61-73, ISSN 2212-683X,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bica.2015.10.001 (Paraense et al., 2016)
7.3 Limitations and Future work
The next steps for improving and testing our hypothesis are the following: working
with varying conscious thresholds for codelet activation - which could be necessary for
a less specialized controller - applying different heuristics in the unconscious automatic
codelets, and working with more complex traffic networks and scenarios, which should
include more real networks and data, to evaluate if these results are scalable.
The next step for evolving our consciousness model is to implement automatization
and deautomatization of behaviours, as novel situations become frequent and are stored
in long term memory, becoming accessible without conscious interference. For instance,
imagine that the heuristic used in this work, that was readily available to unconscious
automatic codelets, would have to be learned somewhere in the history of the controller,
as the agent became more and more experienced. It could also be deautomatized, if
environmental changes somehow turned it into a non functional strategy as time went by.
One true limitation for running the experiments was hardware: having to run a concep-
tually parallel cognitive architecture in a serial computer surely compromises the results.
Even though the Java Virtual Machine implements virtual threads, and the current com-
puters have more than one core in the CPU, in the end of the day, we are still limited
and locked into a seriality.
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As more future work, CST architectures and the machine consciousness technology
produced in this work should be applied to other fields, such as manufacturing, construc-
tion, agriculture, mining, education, etc.
7.4 Conclusion
This work produced evidence to support the hypothesis that an artificial consciousness
mechanism, which serially broadcasts content to automatic processes, can bring advan-
tages to the global task performed by such a society of parallel agents working together
for a common goal. A consistent gain in performance with the “Machine Consciousness”
traffic signal controller during all simulation time, throughout different simulated scenar-
ios, could be observed, ranging from around 10% to more than 20%, when compared to
the “Parallel Reactive” controller without the artificial consciousness mechanism.
Based on the results of the experiments, it would be worth it to apply the technology to
big cities with high traffic. However, it is important to point out that the infrastructure of
the city must allow actuators to adaptively control the traffic lights and sensors to gather
the necessary information about position and velocity of vehicles that the model expects.
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